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1. My name is Bradford Cornell.  I have been retained by counsel for 
Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd., Brigade Distressed Value Master 
Fund Ltd., Tasman Fund LP, BlueMountain Guadalupe Peak Fund L.P., 
BlueMountain Summit Trading L.P., BlueMountain Logan Opportunities Master 
Fund L.P., BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain Montenvers 
Master Fund SCA SICAV-SIF, BlueMountain Timberline Ltd., Farallon Capital 
Institutional Partners III, LP, Noonday Offshore Inc., Farallon Capital Institutional 
Partners, LP, Farallon Capital Offshore Investors II, LP, Farallon Capital 
Institutional Partners II, LP, Farallon Capital AA Investors, LP, Farallon Capital 
Partners, LP, Farallon Capital (AM) Investors, LP, Second Series of Halcyon 
Trading (MI) LLC, Flagler Master Fund SPC Ltd. acting for and on behalf of the 
Class B Segregated Portfolio, Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd., and Verition 
Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd. (collectively, the “Petitioners”) in the above-
captioned appraisal action in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.  
Counsel for Petitioners has asked me to provide an opinion on the fair value of AOL 
Inc. (“AOL” or the “Company”) as of June 23, 2015 (the “Valuation Date”), the date 
upon which Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon” or the “Acquirer”) completed 
its acquisition of AOL (the “Merger” or the “Acquisition”). This report supersedes 
my January 11, 2017 expert report. 




2. As of the Valuation Date, AOL was a “leading global media technology 
company…focused on attracting and engaging consumers by creating and offering 
high quality branded online digital content, products and services and providing 
valuable advertising services on both [its] owned and operated properties and third-
party websites.”1  The Company operated three core segments: AOL platforms 
(“Platforms”), the brands group (“Brands”), and the membership group 
(“Membership”). 
3. AOL and Verizon entered into and announced an Agreement and Plan 
of Merger (the “Merger Agreement”) on May 12, 2015.2  As contemplated in the 
Merger Agreement, on May 26, 2015, Verizon commenced a cash tender offer (the 
“Tender Offer”) to purchase all of AOL’s outstanding common stock at a price of 
$50.00 per share (the “Purchase Price”) through its wholly-owned direct subsidiary 
Hanks Acquisition Sub, Inc.3  On June 23, 2015, following the expiration of the 
Tender Offer, Verizon announced the completion of the Merger.4 
4. The Purchase Price represented a 17.4 percent premium relative to 
$42.59, the closing price of AOL’s common stock on May 11, 2015, the last trading 
                                                     
1 AOL Inc. Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2015 (hereafter 
AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q), at 2. 
2 AOL Inc. Form 8-K dated May 12, 2015, at 1.  
3 AOL Inc. Schedule TO filed May 26, 2015 (hereafter, Schedule TO), at Exhibit 
(a)(1)(A). 
4 AOL Inc. Schedule TO Amendment No. 3 dated June 23, 2015, at 2. 
 




date prior to the announcement of the Merger.  As of May 26, 2015, there were 
78,537,804 shares of AOL common stock outstanding, and an additional 3,053,962 
shares reserved for issuance upon settlement of outstanding equity incentive 
compensation awards.5  The Acquisition was valued at approximately $4.3 billion.6 
5. In forming my opinion on the fair value of AOL as of the Valuation 
Date, I examined a variety of relevant factors, including the transaction price, 
internal AOL management financial projections, market evidence, opinions of 
analysts, and standard valuation techniques. 
6. Based on my review of the foregoing factors, the fair value of AOL as 
of the Valuation Date is $68.98.  I also find that the analysis in the fairness opinion 
of AOL’s financial advisor, Allen & Company (“Allen & Co.”) is unreliable, and 
not an indicator of AOL’s fair value as of the Valuation Date.   
7. I explain in the remainder of this report my qualifications, a summary 
of my opinions and the bases for those opinions, and my conclusions. 
II. QUALIFICATIONS 
8. I am currently a Visiting Professor of Financial Economics at the 
California Institute of Technology (“Caltech”).  Previously, I was a Professor of 
Finance and Director of the Bank of America Research Center at the Anderson 
                                                     
5 Schedule TO, at cover. 
6 Schedule TO, at cover. 




Graduate School of Management at the University of California, Los Angeles for 26 
years. 
9. I earned a master’s degree in Statistics from Stanford University in 
1974 and earned my doctorate in Financial Economics from Stanford in 1975.  I 
have served as an editor of numerous journals relating to business and finance and 
have written more than 100 articles and two books on finance and securities, 
including Corporate Valuation: Tools For Effective Appraisal and Decision Making 
(1993), published by McGraw-Hill (hereafter Corporate Valuation), and The Equity 
Risk Premium and the Long-Run Future of the Stock Market (1999), published by 
John Wiley and Sons.  To complement my academic writing, I have also authored 
numerous articles for The Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times. 
10. My research has been widely recognized.  In 1988, I was cited by the 
Financial Management Association as one of the ten most prolific authors in the field 
of finance.  I have received prizes and grants for my research from the Chicago 
Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the Institute for Quantitative 
Research in Finance.  My article, “Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance,” 
received the 1987 Distinguished Applied Research Award from the Financial 
Management Association.  In 1999, I was awarded the I/B/E/S prize for empirical 
work in finance and accounting (with Wayne Landsman and Jennifer Conrad).  
Richard Roll and I received a Graham and Dodd Scroll Award in 2006 from the 




Financial Analyst Society for our work on delegated agent asset pricing theory.  I 
won this award again in 2011 for my work on economic growth and equity investing.  
My paper entitled “Luck, Skill, and Investment Performance” in The Journal of 
Portfolio Management won an Outstanding Article prize from the 11th Annual 
Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy Awards.  I won this award again in 2015 for my 
article “Tesla: Anatomy of a Run Up” (with Aswath Damodaran).  And my 
Corporate Valuation book has been cited as an authority on valuation by numerous 
courts including the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
11. I have also been active in my profession.  I have served as a Vice 
President of the Western Finance Association.  I am also a past director of both the 
American Finance Association and the Western Finance Association.  I have served 
as an associate editor of numerous professional journals including: The Journal of 
Finance, The Journal of Futures Markets, The Journal of Financial Research, and 
The Journal of International Business Studies.  I have served as a reviewer for nearly 
a dozen other professional journals. 
12. My teaching and writing have focused on a number of different 
financial and economic issues, many of which are relevant to the subject matter of 
this report.  I currently teach Applied Corporate Finance and Investment Banking at 
Caltech.  Examples of other classes I have taught over the course of my academic 
career include Corporate Valuation, the Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 




and Restructurings, Corporate Financial Theory, and Security Valuation and 
Investments. 
13. In addition to my teaching, writing, and research studies, I serve as 
Senior Consultant affiliated with Compass Lexecon, an international consulting 
firm.  As a Senior Consultant, I advise business and legal clients on financial 
economic issues.  Prior to December 2011, I served as a Senior Consultant affiliated 
with Charles River Associates from March 1999 through December 2011.  Between 
1990 and March 1999, I operated FinEcon, a financial economic consulting 
company, through which I also advised business and legal clients on financial 
economic issues. 
14. I also operate an investment fund through San Marino Business 
Partners.  The fund specializes in investments in technology companies.  It has been 
in operation since 2009.   
15. I have served as a consultant and have given testimony for both 
plaintiffs and defendants in a variety of securities, regulatory, and commercial 
lawsuits.  During my many years of experience as an expert witness and consultant, 
I have provided economic analyses and expert testimony (again, for both plaintiffs 
and defendants) related to valuation, corporate finance, portfolio management, and 
damages issues.  I have been engaged as a damages expert in numerous high-profile 
cases which revolved around complex financial and securities transactions.   




16. My background is described more fully in my curriculum vitae, which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.  A list of my publications may also be found in 
Exhibit 1.  A list of testimony I have given in deposition or at trial over the past five 
(5) years may be found in Exhibit 2.  A list of documents I relied upon in forming 
my opinions set forth in this report may be found in Revised Exhibit 3.  
17. In performing my work, I have received assistance from Coherent 
Economics personnel working under my supervision.7  
18. I am being compensated at a rate of $1,050 per hour for my work in this 
matter.  Coherent Economics personnel are being paid at their customary rates, 
ranging from $150 to $755 per hour.  Neither my compensation nor Coherent 
Economics’ is contingent on the results of this case or on my opinions.  
III. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 
19. I understand that the standard for fair value applied to appraisal cases 
in Delaware Chancery Court is based upon the standalone value of the target as a 
going concern, where merger-specific value is excluded.  Further, this Court has 
determined that, when considering the fair value of a target in an appraisal dispute, 
one “must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might 
                                                     
7 Coherent Economics is an economic consulting firm specializing in the 
application of economics to legal, regulatory, and public policy disputes. 
 




enter into the fixing of value,” and account for “facts which were known or which 
could be ascertained as of the date of the merger.”8 
20. To develop my opinions, I reviewed and analyzed production materials 
including management projections and communications; board presentations by 
financial advisors including Allen & Company (“Allen & Co.”), retained by AOL, 
and Guggenheim Partners (“Guggenheim”), retained by Verizon; and annual 
impairment analyses performed by Deloitte Transactions and Business Analytics 
LLP (“Deloitte”); publicly-available trading and financial data; financial news 
articles; analyst reports; and AOL’s and Verizon’s public disclosures and financial 
statements.   
21. I also considered three widely-used valuation techniques: discounted 
cash flow analysis (the “DCF Approach”), peer companies’ analysis (“Peer 
Multiples Approach”), and precedent transactions analysis (“Precedent Transactions 
Approach”).  After considering the inputs and findings using each of these methods, 
and as explained further below, I determined that it is appropriate to place a higher 
weight on implied values using the DCF Approach. 
                                                     
8 In Re: ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litigation, C.A. No. 8388-VCG, Letter 
Opinion of Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III, dated August 11, 2016, at 6; In Re: 
Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., Consolidated C.A. No. 8173-VCG, Memorandum 
Opinion dated January 30, 2015 (hereafter Ancestry.com Appraisal Opinion), at 2, 
34-35. 




22. Based on my review of the foregoing factors, as well as my expertise, I 
have reached the following principal conclusions:   
 
 The fair value per share of AOL common stock as 
of the Valuation Date was $68.98; and 
 
 The valuation analysis provided by Allen & Co. in 
its fairness opinion is unreliable and underestimates 
the fair value of AOL. 
 
 
23. In the following sections, I provide a background on AOL’s historical 
and recent business leading up to the Merger, and explain the bases for my opinions. 
IV. BACKGROUND OF AOL INC. 
A. AOL from 1985 to 2009 
24. AOL was incorporated on May 24, 1985 as Quantum Computer 
Services, an “…online bulletin board for owners of Commodore 64 computers.”9  In 
1989, Quantum Computer Services launched an instant messaging service.10  In 
1991, Quantum Computer Services was renamed America Online.11  In 1992, 
                                                     
9 Rothman, Lily. “A Brief Guide to the Tumultuous 30-Year History of AOL,” 
TIME, May 22, 2015, http://time.com/3857628/aol-1985-history/. Accessed Nov. 
16, 2016 (hereafter Brief Guide to the Tumultuous 30-Year History of AOL). 
10 “Timeline: AOL Through the Years,” CNBC.com, May 12, 2015, 
www.cnbc.com/2015/05/12/timeline-aol-through-the-years.html. Accessed Nov. 
16, 2016 (hereafter AOL Timeline). 
11 Brief Guide to the Tumultuous 30-Year History of AOL. 
 




American Online, Inc., which by then offered services including “electronic mail, 
conferencing, news, sports, weather, stock quotes, software, computing support and 
online classes” completed an initial public offering of 2.3 million shares at a price 
of $11.50 per share.12  In 1993, AOL began mailing CDs to households offering 
internet service.13  
25. America Online grew at a rapid pace through the remainder of the 
1990s, reporting revenue and net income of $6.89 billion and $1.23 billion for the 
year ended June 30, 2000,14 up from revenue and net income of $38.8 million and 
$3.8 million in 1992.15  By the year 2000 America Online was the largest internet 
provider in the United States and had a market capitalization of $125 billion.16  Of 
America Online’s $6.89 billion in revenue, approximately 70 percent, or $4.4 billion, 
came from user subscription services, while $1.6 billion was generated by 
advertising and electronic commerce fees.17  America Online generated advertising 
revenue by placing ads on America Online’s web-based properties (including, 
                                                     
12 “America Online Announces Completion of Initial Public Offering,” PR 
Newswire, March 26, 1992. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2016, from Factiva. 
13 AOL Timeline. 
14 America Online, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2000 
(hereafter America Online Year 2000 10-K), at 19. 
15 America Online, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1996, at 11-
12. 
16 Brief Guide to the Tumultuous 30-Year History of AOL. 
17 America Online Year 2000 10-K at 23, 25. 
 




among others, AOL.com, Moviefone, and MapQuest.com) and subscriber services 
and viewed continued growth in advertising as a critical component of its business 
strategy.18  
26. On January 10, 2000, America Online Inc. and Time Warner Inc. 
entered into a merger agreement, and on January 11, 2001, following regulatory 
approval, the merger was completed.19  As a result of the merger, former America 
Online Inc. stockholders owned approximately 55 percent of AOL Time Warner, 
Inc., which combined the largest internet service provider and the largest media 
company in the United States.20 
27. By 2006, America Online (which officially changed its name to AOL 
in April 2006)21 was facing competitive pressures on several fronts.  Broadband 
internet connectivity was reducing demand for AOL’s dial-up internet service; free 
email services offered by Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and others were reducing 
demand for AOL’s paid email services; and Google and Yahoo were successfully 
                                                     
18 America Online Year 2000 10-K at 12. 
19 “AOL, Time Warner Complete Merger After FCC Grants Conditional 
Approval,” Dow Jones Business News, January 11, 2001. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2016, 
from Factiva. 
20 “AOL, Time Warner Complete Merger After FCC Grants Conditional 
Approval,” Dow Jones Business News, January 11, 2001. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2016, 
from Factiva. 
21 “America Online Changes Name to AOL,” The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 
2006, www.wsj.com/articles/SB114407477586115280. Accessed Nov. 16, 2016. 
 




monetizing online advertising.22  In order to stem the loss of subscribers to AOL’s 
services, AOL announced in August 2006 that it would begin offering its services 
and software for free to broadband users and would pivot to an advertising-based 
revenue model.23  Time Warner reported fiscal year 2006 revenues for AOL of $7.87 
billion and operating income of $1.92 billion.24 
28. On March 12, 2009, Tim Armstrong was named Chairman and CEO of 
AOL, and was tasked with “…helping Time Warner determine the optimal structure 
for AOL.”25  Two months later, on May 28, 2009, Time Warner formally announced 
a spin-off of AOL, stating that: 
AOL will compete as a standalone company – focused on 
growing its Web brands and services, which currently reach more 
than 107 million domestic unique visitors a month, as well as its 
advertising business, which operates the leading online display 
network that reaches more than 91% of the domestic online 
                                                     
22 Annett, Tim. “WSJ.COM/The Afternoon Report: You've Got AOL, For Free,” 
The Wall Street Journal Online, August 2, 2006. Retrieved Nov. 16, 2016, from 
Factiva. 
23 Richmond, Riva. “Time Warner CEO: Strategy Shift To Speed Move To Ad 
Model,” Dow Jones Newswires, August 2, 2006. Retrieved Nov. 16, 2016, from 
Factiva. 
24 Time Warner Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2006, at 
96.  After being spun-off in 2009, AOL in 2010 reported 2006 revenue of $7.79 
billion, operating income of $1.17 billion, and net income of $749.7 million.  See 
AOL Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2009, at 35. 
25 “Tim Armstrong Named Chairman and CEO of AOL; Former Google Executive 
to Build AOL’s Future and Help Determine Optimal Structure for AOL,” Business 
Wire, March 12, 2009. Retrieved Dec. 8, 2016, from Factiva. 
 




audience. AOL will also continue to operate one of the largest 
Internet access subscription services in the U.S.26 
On December 9, 2009, Time Warner completed the spin-off of AOL Inc.27   
29. From 2006, when AOL began its transition to an advertising based 
model, to 2010, the year after Tim Armstrong was hired and AOL was spun-off from 
Time Warner, AOL’s financial performance suffered significantly.  Exhibit 4 shows 
that subscription revenue declined from $5.8 billion to $1.0 billion, while advertising 
and “other” revenue fell from $2.0 billion to $1.4 billion.  EBITDA likewise 
diminished from $1.9 billion to $710.7 million, as shown in Exhibit 5. 
B. AOL’s performance from 2010 to 2014 
30. Between 2010 and the Acquisition, AOL engaged in a series of strategic 
moves that improved its overall performance and grew revenue and earnings.   
31. The AOL Platforms segment (known as the “AOL Networks” segment 
prior to 2014) experienced revenue growth from, among other things, (i) sales of 
third party properties through Advertising.com, (ii) increased utilization of the 
segment by publishers and advertisers, (iii) increased sales of premium packages and 
products, and (iv) increased sales of premium formats across the programmatic 
                                                     
26 “Time Warner Inc. Announces Plan to Separate AOL,” Time Warner Press 
Release, May 28, 2009. Retrieved Nov. 16, 2016, from Factiva. 
27 “Time Warner Inc. Completes Spin-off of AOL Inc.,” Time Warner Press 
Release, December 10, 2009. Retrieved Nov. 16, 2016, from Factiva. 
 




platform.28  The Brands segment experienced growth due to, among other things,  
increased search revenue and increased global display revenue.29 The Membership 
segment revenue, however, continued to decline from the loss of domestic AOL 
subscribers.30 
32. A central element of AOL’s development during this period involved 
the acquisition of key components to its programmatic platform.  As online 
advertising and marketing rapidly expanded, AOL invested in its programmatic 
technology “in order for advertisers and agencies to better manage their advertising 
campaigns through the use of [AOL’s] optimization technology.”31  This strategy 
included a series of acquisitions, including the following:32: 
 In 2010, AOL engaged in a series of acquisitions with an 
aggregate purchase price of $160.6 million, including 
TechCrunch, StudioNow, Inc., 5 Minutes Ltd., Thing Labs, 
Inc., Pictela, Inc., and About.me, Inc. 
 
 On January 31, 2011, AOL acquired goviral ApS (now “Be 
On”), a “company that distributes branded online video for 
                                                     
28 AOL Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2013 (hereafter 
AOL Inc. Year 2013 10-K), at 49. 
29 AOL Inc. Year 2013 10-K, at 47. 
30 AOL Inc. Year 2013 10-K, at 48. 
31 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q, at 4. 
32 AOL Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2010, at 85-86 
(comprising of the acquisitions of StudioNow, Inc. (for a purchase price of $32.1 
million), 5 Minutes Ltd. (for a purchase price of $64.7 million), and other 
acquisitions including Thing Labs, Inc., TechCrunch, Inc., Pictela, Inc., and 
About.me Inc. (for a combined aggregate purchase price of $63.8 million); AOL 
Inc. Year 2013 10-K, at 80-82, 84; AOL Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended 
December 31, 2014 (hereafter AOL Inc Year 2014 10-K), at 2, 85-87, 90. 




media agencies, creative agencies and content producers,” 
paying total consideration of $69.1 million. 
 
  On March 4, 2011, AOL acquired The Huffington Post, an 
“innovative internet source of online news, analysis, 
commentary, entertainment and community engagement” for 
total consideration of $295.5 million.  AOL disclosed that it 
expected that the acquisition would “enhance the Company’s 
ability to serve audiences across several platforms.” 
 
 AOL completed several acquisitions in 2012 with combined 
consideration paid of $29.0 million, including a share 
purchase agreement concerning an additional 3 percent stake 
in Ad.com Japan. 
 
 On June 15, 2012, AOL completed the sale of approximately 
800 patents and a non-exclusive license to AOL’s retained 
patent portfolio to Microsoft Corporation in exchange for net 
consideration of $1.056 billion in cash. 
 
 On September 5, 2013, AOL acquired Adap.tv, “an online 
video advertising company whose advertising technology 
platform provides advertisers and publishers the ability to buy 
and sell video advertising inventory across desktop, mobile, 
and connected TV platforms,” for a purchase price of $410.6 
million. 
 
 AOL completed strategic acquisitions in 2014 that it touted as 
“important components” to its Platforms segment.  On 
January 23, 2014, AOL completed its acquisition of Project 
Rover, Inc. (Gravity), “a company that offers multi- screen 
content optimization and personalization using patented 
technology that creates interest graphs based on individuals’ 
interests, preferences and habits and that allows publishers to 
offer a tailored and relevant selection of editorial and 
advertising content to readers” for a purchase price of $83.2 
million.  On May 6, 2014, AOL completed its acquisition of 
Convertro, “a leading multi- touch attribution modeling 
technology company” for a purchase price of $98.6 million.  




And on December 1, 2014, AOL completed its acquisitions 
of Vidible, “a programmatic video exchange platform for 
discovering and distributing video content that will enable 
licensees and licensors to distribute and monetize video 
content across all internet- enabled devices” for a purchase 
price of $55.9 million. 
 
 
33. AOL’s August 13, 2014 convertible notes offering presentation 
reported that AOL revenue was “growing consistently” and that earnings (adjusted 
OIBDA) continued to experience growth “driven by a combination of revenue 
growth and strategic investment with overall expense reduction.”33  This growth was 
also reflected in AOL’s revenue shift toward the Platforms (previously called 
Networks) segment and away from the Membership segment.  In 2010, the Platforms 
segment contributed 17.7 percent and the Membership segment contributed 52.9 
percent of AOL’s $2.4 billion annual revenues from its operating segments.34   The 
remaining 30.1 percent of revenues were generated by the Brands segment.  By 
2014, the Platforms segment had grown to contribute 42.8 percent of AOL’s $2.5 
billion annual revenues from its operating segments, while the Membership segment 
                                                     
33 AOL Inc., “A Media Technology Company: $300M Convertible Notes 
Offering,” August 13, 2014 (AOL0000465011- 49) (henceforth, August 2014 
Convertible Notes Offering Presentation), at AOL00465040.  
34 AOL Inc. annual year-end financial data per S&P Capital IQ.  Revenue figures 
include AOL’s three operating segments and do not reflect the Corporate segment. 
 




had declined to contribute only 31.3 percent of revenues.35  The remaining 30.5 
percent of total annual revenues were generated by the Brands segment.  
34. The offering presentation also shows an annotated stock price chart 
showing that, between November 2009 and August 2014, AOL’s stock price 
outperformed the S&P 500 Index and MS Internet Index.36  Notably, the annotations 
on the chart correspond to selected AOL earnings announcements and strategic 
acquisitions, including those listed above.   
35. Likewise, Exhibit 6 shows that AOL underperformed relative to the 
market (measured by the S&P 400 Mid-Cap Index and the S&P 500 Index) after its 
2009 spinoff from Time Warner through the first half of 2011.  In fact, AOL’s stock 
price experienced a total return of -56.5 percent by the time it reached the trough of 
its descent on October 10, 2011.  But the exhibit also shows that AOL’s stock price 
recovered thereafter and overperformed relative to the market.     
36. The series of strategic actions, including its acquisitions from 2010 
through 2014, meaningfully contributed to AOL’s improved financial performance.  
                                                     
35 AOL Inc. annual year-end financial data per S&P Capital IQ.  Revenue figures 
include AOL’s three operating segments and do not reflect the Corporate segment. 
36 August 2014 Convertible Notes Offering Presentation, at AOL00465043. 
 




C. Outlook for AOL as of the Valuation Date 
37. As I show in the following subsections, AOL’s three segments varied 
in the expectation of their future growth and prospects as of the Valuation Date.  
Nonetheless, in a January 7, 2015 interview on CNBC, Tim Armstrong responded 
to inquiries of takeover rumors that “AOL has a killer strategy for the future.”37  At 
a March 10, 2015 Deutsche Bank Media, Internet and Telecom Conference, 
Armstrong also said that:  
I’m of the fundamental belief that if we take the first half of this 
year to continue to get our platform products right, we get the 
brand products correctly done, and we continue to focus on AOL 
core and make it decline less, we will be in a really good position 
in the second half of ’15 and ’16 and ’17 and ’18 to take 
advantage of what I would say are fairly epic platform shifts 
happening in media overall.38 
 
These public statements suggest an optimism of what was achievable by AOL as a 
standalone entity in the near future. 
1. The Membership Segment 
38. AOL’s Membership group is comprised of communication products 
(such as AOL Mail) and services (such as AOL Search) to registered account 
                                                     
37 Tim Armstrong, CNBC, “Squawk on the Street,” 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/07/aol-ceo-armstrong-dismisses-merger-takeover-
rumors.html (video clip). 
38 “AOL Inc. Company Conference Presentation,” March 10, 2015, at 5. 
 




holders.39  AOL generates revenue on paid services and through advertising fees 
targeted at their registered account holders.  These advertising revenues are 
generated through display and search advertising.40 
39. AOL and parties valuing AOL had different views about the prospects 
for Membership.  
40. During AOL’s earnings call discussing results for the first quarter of 
2015 held on May 8, 2015, Karen Dykstra stated that Membership continued to 
experience declining revenues based on fewer subscribers, but that AOL 
“continue[s] to explore additional means of driving future growth.”41 
41. On the other hand, Guggenheim, one of Verizon’s financial advisors in 
the Merger, concluded in a May 1, 2015 valuation presentation that: “Hanks’ 
Core/Membership segment is already in a stage of steady long-term decline, but its 
                                                     
39 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 3. 
40 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 3. 
41 AOL Inc. FQ1 2015 Earnings Call Transcripts, May 8, 2015 (hereafter AOL Inc. 
FQ1 2015 Earnings Call), at 7 (stating that: “[w]e continue to see solid trends as 
Membership Group revenues declined 7%, remained constant with last quarter on 
11% fewer subscribers. Churn declined year-over-year to 1.4% and ARPU grew 
7% year-over-year. Membership adjusted OIBDA declined by 8%, primarily 
reflecting the revenue decline I just mentioned as well as the expenses associated 
with R&D. We had previously said that declining less is not our long-term goal, 
and we continue to explore additional means of driving future growth. Some of this 
investment impacted margins this quarter, although we still expect margins for the 
year to remain in the low 70% range.”). 
 




Platforms and Brands segments will not have reached steady state revenue growth 
rates and margins by the end of the projection horizon in 2018.”42 
2. The Brands Segment 
42. AOL’s Brands segment consists of its “portfolio of distinct and unique 
content brands as well as certain service brands.”43  These Brands websites include 
the Huffington Post, TechCrunch and MapQuest, as well as “co-branded websites 
[that are] owned or operated by third parties.”44  AOL generates advertising revenues 
in the Brands segment “primarily through display advertising (which includes video 
advertising) and search advertising.”45  Display advertising includes the “display of 
graphical advertisements and other performance-based advertising” on Brands 
sites.46 
43. AOL’s then-Chief Financial Officer Karen Dykstra expressed high 
expectations for Brands, stating in May 2015 that the Brands segment OIBDA 
margins increased to 7% “despite the increase in investment in video production 
across our owned and operated properties during the quarter” and that “[l]ong-term, 
                                                     
42 Guggenheim presentation titled “Project Hanks Preliminary Thoughts on 
Valuation” May 1, 2015 (VZ-0007847-928) (hereafter, Guggenheim May 
Valuation) at 1. 
43 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 3. 
44 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 3. 
45 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 3. 
46 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 3 
 




we believe we can and should be operating this business with consistent margins of 
approximately 20%.”47 During her deposition, Karen Dykstra testified that she 
considered Brands to be a growth business.48 
3. The Platforms Segment 
44. AOL’s Platforms segment “consists of interconnected programmatic 
(automated) and premium advertising offerings and technologies that advertisers and 
publishers use to reach consumers across all devices.”49  Platforms features “end-to-
end open programmatic buying experience[s]” to advertisers and publishers “by 
providing access to Third Party Properties and AOL Properties, ad serving, content 
personalization, targeting, attribution and cross-channel analytics.”50   
                                                     
47 AOL Inc. FQ1 2015 Earnings Call at 6 (stating that: “Brand Group OIBDA 
increased by $11 million year-over-year, driven by growth in Search revenue and 
the significant overall cost savings from the reorganization we began in Q1. 
Margin expansion is a key callout for the segment for the quarter, rising to 7% and 
highlighting both the incremental high margins of the group and the potential for 
further margin expansion once display revenue returns to stable growth. I'm 
particularly encouraged by the fact that margin expansion came despite the 
increase in investment in video production across our owned and operated 
properties during the quarter. As we think about the remainder of the year, we 
expect Brand Group margins to be in the mid-single digits for the next two 
quarters, reflecting the impacts on display revenue from the sales reorg before 
rebounding to low double digits for the fourth quarter. Long-term, we believe we 
can and should be operating this business with consistent margins of approximately 
20%.”). 
48 Deposition of Karen E. Dykstra, August 30, 2016 (hereafter Dykstra 
Deposition), at 34. 
49 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 4. 
50 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 4. 
 




45. In April 2015, AOL launched an initiative called “ONE by AOL,” 
which it describes as a “single, unified enterprise-level platform” that integrates its 
“data, attribution, and…buying platforms to provide advertisers with predictive 
analytics.”51  Considered a product aimed at competing with Google and Facebook, 
AOL’s initial clients of ONE included Bank of America, General Motors, and 
Verizon.52   
46. AOL’s Platforms segment primarily generates revenue through “the 
sale of advertising on third party websites and from advertising inventory on AOL 
Properties not sold directly to advertisers.”53  Platforms also earns revenues from 
“fees generated from publishers and advertisers using Adap.tv’s platform technology 
and features,” and “from licensing Convertro’s attribution modeling technology.”54  
With respect to the business prospects of the segment, AOL reported in May 2015 
that: 
The online display advertising market has experienced a rapid 
and significant increase in programmatic buying of advertising 
inventory…We believe there is a significant opportunity to 
attract advertisers through the increased sale of premium 
formats, including video, through AOL Platforms. We believe 
                                                     
51 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 4. 
52 Gelles, David. “Verizon Bets on Video Ads in $4 Billion Deal for AOL,” NYT 
Dealbook, May 12, 2015, 
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/business/dealbook/verizon-to-buy-aol-for-4-4-
billion.html. Accessed Nov. 16, 2016. 
53 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 4. 
54 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 4. 
 




our scale, ability to target premium audiences and investments in 
technology and premium formats will allow us to increase the 
number of advertisers we work with and enable us to capitalize 
on the increase in programmatic buying. We believe our 
investments in premium formats and targeting will enable us to 
maximize yield for our advertisers.55 
 
47. In line with these prospects, AOL’s senior management expressed high 
expectations for growth in its Platforms business. In AOL’s February 11, 2015 
earnings call concerning results for the fourth quarter of 2014, Karen Dykstra 
explained that “2014 was a transformational year for the group which grew 20% 
year-over-year for the fourth quarter, which was driven by strong growth across all 
programmatic offerings including Adap.tv, AOP and MARKETPLACE.”56  
48. During the same earnings call, Tim Armstrong told investors that 
“basically we believe long-term the platform business is going to be a significant 
growth driver for the company” and that “the most important thing is, is [sic] AOL 
have the capabilities and the systems to compete in growth markets on the Platform 
business going forward? The answer is definitively yes. And I think you’ll see at the 
second half of ’15 and certainly in ’16 and ’17 a much different growth trajectory 
and profitable trajectory out of that business.”57  
                                                     
55 AOL Inc. Q1 2015 10-Q at 4. 
56 AOL Inc. FQ4 2014 Earnings Call Transcripts, February 11, 2015 (hereafter 
AOL Inc. FQ4 2014 Earnings Call), at 6. 
57 AOL Inc. FQ4 2014 Earnings Call at 10. 




49. AOL’s senior management described another “strong quarter for AOL” 
in AOL’s May 2015 earnings conference concerning results for the first quarter 
2015.  With respect to the Platforms segment, Karen Dykstra stated that “I see the 
signs where we have clear plans and I think that we are executing against our plans 
to get to the double-digit margin in the Platforms business.”58  Tim Armstrong 
emphasized that “we’re really trying to position ourselves and really building 
towards being 1 of the top 3 in this area [platforms].”59 
50. AOL’s expectations concerning rapid growth in programmatic 
advertising are consistent with those expressed in the financial press.  For example, 
Business Insider reported in a May 29, 2015 article that “[s]pending on 
programmatic advertising is growing quickly, at ~20% annually” and that real-time 
bidding was projected “to move from a 31 percent share of total U.S. digital 
advertising revenue in 2015 to 48 percent in 2020.”60 
51. During her deposition, Karen Dykstra testified that she considered 
Platforms a growth business and that she expected “the platform programmatic 
                                                     
58 AOL Inc. FQ1 2015 Earnings Call at 15. 
59 AOL Inc. FQ1 2015 Earnings Call at 15-16. 
60 May 29, 2015, Business Insider, “The Programmatic Advertising Report: 








revenue and the platforms growth to continue.”61 AOL Board Member Fredric G. 
Reynolds also testified during his deposition that AOL’s strategy was “to grow and 
become a significant player in the programmatic advertising business” and that he 
believed programmatic advertising was a growth opportunity “because it was a 
nascent industry.”62 
D. AOL's M&A Activity 
  
52. Consistent with its recent history of acquisitions, AOL prioritized 
merger and acquisition (“M&A”) activity as a key part of AOL’s strategy prior to 
and as of the Valuation Date.  For 2015, management expected its cash funding 
needs for M&A activity to range between $200 million and $1 billion.63  AOL also 
maintained long-term projections both including and excluding M&A activity 
through the Platforms segment.64   
53. Moreover, AOL was in advanced negotiations to complete key 
transactions prior to closing the Merger that were part of AOL’s standalone growth 
strategy:  deals involving Millennial Media Inc. (“Millennial Media”) and Microsoft 
Corp. (“Microsoft”).  In fact, AOL’s final approval memo concerning Millennial 
                                                     
61 Dykstra Deposition at 34 and 69. 
62 Deposition of Fredric G. Reynolds, October 27, 2016, at 34. 
63 AOL Board of Directors Meeting Materials, February 27, 2015 (AOL00002429) 
at 459, 463. 
64 See, for example, V22.1 M&A Adjusted (AOL00277900) at tabs “Consolidated 
no M&A” and “Consolidated with M&A”.  
 




Media documents its view that the acquisition of Millennial Media was critical to its 
mobile scale needs and that AOL planned to complete the acquisition of Millennial 
Media regardless of the outcome of its merger plans with Verizon.65   
54. In an October 23, 2014 presentation to the Board of Directors, AOL 
stated that its 2015 strategy was to “transform AOL into a video, mobile, and 
programmatic platform company.”66  Among other competitive moves it 
contemplated to achieve this strategy, AOL pursued the acquisition of companies 
like Millennial Media, a “mobile advertising marketplace delivering products and 
services to advertisers and developers.” The goal of Millennial Media’s products and 
services is to “help developers and advertisers remove the complexity from mobile 
advertising”67 and “build end-to-end ‘high ground’ advantage with acceleration of 
ONE by AOL for advertisers.”68  
55. In a January 29, 2015 presentation to AOL’s Board of Directors, Allen 
& Co. explained that AOL had “developed a scale tech stack, but has areas to 
complete its end-to-end solution,” including building a mobile programmatic 
                                                     
65 Memorandum re: Agreement and Plan of Merger between Millennial Media, Inc. 
and AOL Inc., August 25, 2015 (AOL00304862), at 1-2. 
66 AOL Board of Directors Meeting Materials, October 23, 2014 (AOL00001567) 
at 587. 
67 Millennial Media, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 
2014, at 5. 
68 AOL Board of Directors Meeting Materials, October 23, 2014 (AOL00001567) 
at 684. 
 




technology. Allen & Co. further explained that while internal development was 
scheduled to continue, value creation could be accelerated through M&A.69  
56. In a February 27, 2015 presentation, AOL characterized the deal as a 
“potential acquisition of end-to-end mobile programmatic ad stack” with Millennial 
Media representing “the only major scaled mobile scaled player to significantly 
increase mobile inventory for AOLP [AOL Platforms].”70 
57. In a March 29, 2015 presentation to the Board, AOL stated it had 
retained Goldman Sachs as its financial advisor for a transaction involving 
Millennial Media, that it was “[finalizing its] acquisition business and valuation” 
and that it would “[m]ake a go/no go decision and determine transaction structure 
and proposal.”71 
58. In an internal presentation dated June 10, 2015, AOL explained it had 
“received approval from Verizon to engage with [Millennial Media] for 
confirmatory due diligence to be in position to execute a definitive agreement in 
mid-July post the closing of the AOL/Verizon transaction.”72 
                                                     
69 Allen & Company Presentation, “AOL Board Discussion Materials,” January 29, 
2015 (AOL00191667), at 7-8.  
70 AOL presentation, “AOL Inc. Strategic Priorities & Deal Landscape,” February 
27, 2015 (AOL00122114) (hereafter AOL00122114), at 10. 
71 AOL presentation, “AOL Inc. Strategic Priorities & Deal Landscape,” March 29, 
2015 (AOL00002625) (hereafter AOL00002625), at 3, 7. 
72 AOL presentation, “Project MARS Kick-Off Meeting,” June 10, 2015 
(AOL00159738), at 2. 
 




59. On September 3, 2015, Millennial Media entered into a merger 
agreement with AOL commencing a “tender offer to purchase all of the outstanding 
shares of [Millennial Media’s] common stock... at a price of $1.75 per share” or 
approximately $280.7 million. AOL completed the acquisition of Millennial Media 
on October 23, 2015.73  AOL Platforms President Bob Lord stated in the press release 
announcing the deal that the “acquisition of Millennial Media accelerates [AOL’s] 
competitive mobile offering in ONE by AOL and enhances [AOL’s] current 
publisher offering with an ‘all in’ monetization platform for app developers.”74 
60.  When the deal closed on October 23, 2015, AOL explained that the 
acquisition: “Solidifies ONE by AOL as the Premier Open and Mobile-First 
Programmatic Platform in the Market and Enhances AOL’s Suite of Publisher 
Offerings with Leading Monetization Platform for App Developers.”75  Bob Lord 
reported that the acquisition “boosts our global, mobile capabilities and scale across 
ONE by AOL for advertisers and agencies, and offers the most attractive 
monetization platform for app developers.”76  AOL also disclosed that nine 
executives from Millennial Media were taking “leadership and integral roles” in the 
                                                     
73 Millennial Media, Inc. Form 8-K filed on October 23, 2015, at 2-3. 
74 Millennial Media, Inc. Form 8-K filed on September 3, 2015, Exhibit 99.1. 
75 “AOL Completes Acquisition of Millennial Media,” AOL Press Release, Oct. 
23, 2015. Retrieved Nov. 16, 2016, from Factiva (hereafter AOL Press Release, 
Oct. 23, 2015). 
76 AOL Press Release, Oct. 23, 2015. 
 




Platforms segment in technology, sales, product and operations.77  Tim Armstrong 
sent an email to the (by then disbanded) AOL board of directors informing them that 
the deal had closed and thanking them for approving the transaction, which he 
described as a “big deal.”78 
61. In addition to Millennial Media, on June 29, 2015, just six days 
following the closing of the Merger, AOL and Microsoft announced “a global, 
enterprise-level partnership where AOL will assume management and sales 
responsibility for all of Microsoft’s display, mobile and video advertising inventory 
in nine key global markets” and that “AOL will represent inventory from across 
Microsoft’s suite of leading online brands, including MSN Homepage and verticals, 
Outlook Mail, Xbox, Skype and ads in apps.”79  The announcement disclosed that 
the partnership included a 10-year “global search and search advertising agreement 
between AOL and Microsoft” with AOL transitioning to a “Bing-powered search 
solution beginning January 1, 2016.”80  Prior to the global search agreement with 
                                                     
77 AOL Press Release, Oct. 23, 2015. 
78 E-mail from Tim Armstrong (AOL) to Frederic Reynolds, James Stengel, 
Patricia Mitchell, Alberto Ibarguren, Rick Dalzell, Hugh Johnston, Dawn Lepore, 
Eve Burton, Julie Jacobs; Karen Dykstra (AOL), and David Bell, September 3, 
2015 (AOL00348775). 
79 “AOL and Microsoft Expand Global Enterprise-Level Partnership” AOL News 
Release, June 29, 2015, http://corp.aol.com/news/aol-and-microsoft-expand-
global-enterprise-level-partnership.  Accessed on September 3, 2016 (hereafter 
AOL News Release, June 29, 2015). 
80 AOL News Release, June 29, 2015.   
 




Microsoft, Google was the “exclusive web search and search-based advertising 
provider for AOL Properties, based on [the] agreement that runs through December 
31, 2015.”81  
62. The deal between AOL and Microsoft had been contemplated well in 
advance of the Acquisition.   
63. In a presentation dated February 27, 2015, AOL characterized the deal 
as an “opportunity to purchase Microsoft’s global portal business (MSN) as well as 
enter into a long-term commercial deal to monetize MSFT’s other advertising 
inventory (i.e. Skype, Outlook, Xbox).”82 
64. In a March 29, 2015, presentation to the Board, AOL management 
informed the Board that completed terms for the Microsoft Display deal were 
targeted for mid-April 2015 but that a deal announcement was “to occur by mid-
June or earlier.”  AOL management also told the Board that the “signing of [the] 
search deal with [Microsoft] would be a condition to the deal going through.”83  
65. In an internal memo dated April 11, 2015, AOL CEO Tim Armstrong 
explained that: 
the [Microsoft Display] deal also continues to progress and it is 
an operational deal fro [sic] search and display. Regardless of the 
[Verizon] outcome, [Microsoft Display] is a deal we would like 
to do and is a non-transaction based deal. We do not have papered 
                                                     
81 AOL Inc Year 2014 10-K at 10. 
82 AOL00122114 at 9. 
83 AOL00002625 at 3, 6. 




terms or definitive documents done on [Microsoft Display], but 
we will move to that stage shortly. The value of that this deal has 
been modeled, but it is a fill in for the search changes we will see 
in 2016 – and may not add additional profits to AOL unless the 
risks can be removed.84  
 
66. Subsequently, in a May 14, 2015, e-mail, AOL’s Timothy Lemmon 
stated that AOL was “on final approach for landing of a whole squadron of planes 
on the AOL Carrier during the 5 day period May 27 - June 1… Maple [Microsoft 
Display] deal 5-27 (no announcement)… Search deal 5-27 (no announcement).”85  
Thus, it appears the Microsoft Display deal was in an advanced stage, and effectively 
completed, prior to the Valuation Date. 
67. To sum, the Millennial Media and Microsoft Display deals were 
expected to have a material impact on AOL’s financial performance.  The 
transactions were at an advanced stage – or effectively completed – as of the 
Valuation Date, and the economic impact of their additions must reasonably be 
considered as part of an appraisal of AOL as a going concern as-of the Valuation 
Date. 
                                                     
84 Memo from Tim Armstrong (AOL), April 11, 2015 (AOL00191571).  
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V. THE FAIR VALUE OF A SHARE OF AOL COMMON STOCK AS 
OF THE VALUATION DATE WAS $68.98 
68. I consider the DCF Approach, the Peer Multiples Approach, and 
Precedent Transactions Approach in determining the fair value of AOL as of the 
Valuation Date.  In this section, I describe each of these valuation methods, the 
reasons why these approaches can or cannot be applied when valuing AOL, the 
inputs that I applied to each method (and the rationale for those inputs), and the 
implied values for AOL resulting from the application of these methods. 
A. DCF Approach 
69. The DCF Approach is based on the widely-accepted principle that a 
company is worth its expected future cash flows discounted to the present.86 In other 
words, the value of a company today is based on its ability to generate future income.  
70. This approach has three primary components: (1) expected future cash 
flows over a discrete projection period, (2) a discount rate, and (3) a terminal value. 
71. The discount rate reflects the riskiness of the company in achieving the 
expected future income as well as the time value of money.  Practitioners, investment 
                                                     
86 One textbook describes it as follows: “The enterprise DCF model discounts free 
cash flow, meaning the cash flow available to all investors—equity holders, debt 
holders, and any other nonequity investors—at the weighted average cost of 
capital, meaning the blended cost for all investor capital.  The claims on cash flow 
of debt holders and other nonequity investors are subtracted from enterprise value 
to determine equity holders’ value.”  Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David 
Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 5th ed., 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010) at 102 (footnote omitted). 




banks, and companies routinely compute the discount rate using the formula for an 
entity’s weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”).  The WACC is weighted by 
the firm’s capital structure components: equity, debt, and (if applicable) any 
preferred stock.  It weights the riskiness of each of a company’s capital components 
based on the company’s capital structure.  For example, if the enterprise value of a 
company is comprised of 50 percent equity and 50 percent debt, and its cost of equity 
equals 12 percent and its (after-tax) cost of debt equals 9 percent, then that firm’s 
WACC is equal to 10.5 percent (= (50 percent x 12 percent) + (50 percent x 9 
percent)).   
72. Determining a firm’s cost of equity and cost of debt typically requires 
estimating both based on the key features of the firm’s equity and debt, and those of 
its peers.  In the sections that follow, I describe the inputs that go into my DCF model 
in detail and set forth my estimated range for AOL’s fair value as of the Valuation 
Date. 
1. Free Cash Flow Projections 
73. The proposition that managers know more about the operations and 
value of the companies than investors lies at the core of modern corporate finance. 
Originally developed in classic articles by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers 
(1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984), the view that there is asymmetric information 
between managers and investors has been developed and tested in hundreds of 




articles and found its way into the leading textbooks in the field.87 For example, 
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2014) state that:  
Managers obviously know more than investors. We can prove that by 
observing stock price changes caused by announcements by managers. 
For example, when a company announces an increased regular 
dividend, stock price typically rises, because investors interpret the 
increase as a sign of management’s confidence in future earnings.88  
 
74. In the case of AOL, management’s insider knowledge was particularly 
important because the market was not yet fully aware of all of AOL’s initiatives.  
For example, AOL was finalizing strategic transactions with Millennial Media and 
Microsoft Display before, during and after it disclosed the Acquisition, but did not 
disclose these transactions until after completion of the Acquisition.   
75. During the years 2014 and 2015, AOL’s management prepared and 
updated four-year long-term plans (“LTP”) that included annual segment-level 
projections for total revenue, total expenses, and adjusted operating income before 
                                                     
87 See, Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. “Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 3 (1976) 305-360; Myers, Stewart C. “Determinants of 
Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial Economics 5 (1977): 147-175; and 
Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. Majluf, “Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors do not have,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 13 (1984) 187-221. 
88 Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, and Franklin Allen, Principles of 
Corporate Finance, 11th Ed. (McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2014) at 467. 
 




depreciation and amortization (“AOIBDA”).89  These segment-level LTP 
projections are comprised of AOL’s individual business level revenue, margin, and 
AOIBDA projections, as well as segment-level expense items.90 
76. I sought out the most contemporaneous management projections as of 
the Valuation Date.  I reviewed numerous versions of AOL’s LTP projections.  
Typically, the projections used by a target’s financial advisors reflect the most 
updated version of management’s projections available at the time of a transaction.  
However, the production documents that I have reviewed indicate that Allen & Co. 
used a set of LTP projections in its Fairness Opinion that AOL management 
described as outdated.  Moreover, the projections used by Allen & Co. differ from 
those that were supplied to, and used by, Verizon’s financial advisors.  I therefore 
had to use the evidence in the production to independently determine what version 
                                                     
89 See, e.g. V22 M&A Adjusted – TH (AOL00338395) (hereafter AOL00338395). 
AOL’s LTP AOIBDA projections match Allen & Co.’s EBITDA projections. AOL 
also defines in the LTPs free cash flows as cash paid for interest, plus other 
income/expense, minus restructuring payments, minus working capital timing, 
minus Google prepayment, minus product development costs, minus principal 
payments on capital leases and fixed assets, minus cash paid for taxes. Because this 
definition includes items such as cash paid for interest and principal payments on 
capital leases and fixed assets, the cash flows calculated by AOL are levered free 
cash flows.  Unlevered free cash flows, which do not include the impact of 
leverage, are used in the DCF Approach.  
90 See, e.g., AOL00338395 at tabs “I.B.1 AOL CORE LTP,” “I.B.2 iBRANDs,” 
and “I.B.3 AOL Platforms.” 




of AOL’s LTP projections were the most reliable indicator of AOL’s prospects as of 
the Valuation Date.  
77. Documents produced in discovery show that Allen & Co. considered a 
series of AOL projections from at least March 2014 through the Valuation Date.  In 
the months leading up to the Acquisition – in particular, during the period April 13, 
2015 through May 11, 2015 (the date of Allen & Co.’s Fairness Opinion) – Allen & 
Co. considered a series of AOL projections.  Throughout this period, production 
materials show Allen & Co. using AOL revenue and EBITDA projections for the 
years 2015 through 2018 that are constant across different updates to the AOL LTP 
projections.  See Exhibits 7-1 and 7-2.  However, the same materials also show 
Allen & Co. using a range of projections for other key metrics that affect free cash 
flow: namely, (i) depreciation & amortization, (ii) stock-based compensation 
(“SBC”), (iii) capital expenditures, and (iv) change in working capital.  Exhibits 7-
1 through 7-6 compare the projected values for these metrics used in various Allen 
& Co. materials, with differences in projected values for certain metrics – except for 
revenue and EBITDA.   
78. Typically, one would expect Allen & Co.’s analysis to evolve over time 
such that it ultimately incorporated the most-updated versions of management 
projections into its Fairness Opinion.  Allen & Co. apparently did not do so in this 
case; instead, it seemingly used outdated projections for key metrics.   




a) Depreciation & Amortization 
79. Exhibit 7-3 shows the projections that Allen & Co. used for 
depreciation & amortization in its analyses prior to and in its Fairness Opinion.  
AOL’s projections for depreciation & amortization do not vary significantly across 
versions of the LTP: the largest deviation occurs in the version provided to Verizon, 
which shows higher depreciation & amortization in the near term.   
b) Stock-Based Compensation 
80. Exhibit 7-4 shows the projections that Allen & Co. used for stock-
based compensation in its analyses prior to and in its Fairness Opinion.  The exhibit 
summarizes “Old” projections based on a “Previous LRP” and “Improved CF” 
projections reflecting updated stock-based compensation forecasts.  Allen & Co. 
used the “Old” stock-based compensation projections in their Fairness Opinion 
Presentation to AOL’s Board.  The exhibit also shows management’s projections for 
stock-based compensation in its sum-of-the-parts (“SOTP”) analyses, which I 
incorporate into my own sum-of-the-parts analysis.  Exhibit 7-4 compares 
management’s projections for stock-based compensation used by Allen & Co. 
(based on the “Old” projections), Verizon (based on “Improved CF” projections), 
and myself (based on management’s sum-of-the-parts projections).   




c) Capital Expenditures 
81. Exhibit 7-5 shows the projections that Allen & Co. used for capital 
expenditures in its analyses prior to and in its Fairness Opinion.  The projections of 
capital expenditures used by Allen & Co. in its Fairness Opinion exceed those from 
management’s updated projections and those provided to Verizon.  The capital 
expenditures that I use are similar to those used by Verizon, and are based upon the 
“updated” projections that were provided to Allen & Co.  See Exhibit 7-5. 
d) Change in Working Capital 
82. Email communications between AOL members of management dated 
April 20, 2015, describe change in working capital projections that were formed “in 
a vacuum” and are “stale,” whereas updated projections are “a better estimate of 
future working capital needs.”91  Yet Allen & Co.’s Fairness Opinion includes the 
older, “stale” change in working capital projections.  Because the outdated 
projections imply lower free cash flow projections, Allen & Co.’s findings 
concerning AOL’s value understate the value that Allen & Co. would have found 
had it used the most updated version of AOL’s projections.   The last available 
projections that I identified in the production materials are a set of AOL LTP 
                                                     
91 Email from Vijay Kori (AOL) to Mike Nolan (AOL), et al., April 20, 2015 
(AOL00221212-214) (hereafter AOL00221212). 
 




projections that were updated on or around April 20, 2015.92  Communications from 
AOL to Allen & Co. indicate that these LTP projections include updated working 
capital requirements figures that “were created by our Controller, FP&A [Financial 
Planning & Analysis], and the CFOs of the segments to factor in our current payable 
and receivable cycles so is a better estimate of future working capital needs.”93  AOL 
also provided these projections to Verizon, purportedly to replace outdated 
projections.94  With respect to AOL providing information such as the updated 
projections to Verizon, Tim Armstrong cautioned his team on April 23, 2015 to be: 
really careful that the data going over to [Verizon] is highly organized 
and is not point solution focused. Based on some of the data like 
working capital and tax, [Verizon] may struggle to correctly understand 
how our business works and what the velocity / story is. To be super 
direct, we should not let [Verizon] find pieces of data – they should find 
us providing full context and progress. Can't stress this enough. No one-
offs and make sure internal AOL transparency is very high and 
communication is flowing. Measure twice / cut once.95  
 
                                                     
92 ALLEN_00030067 (03 14 2015 v12b - Backup 05 10 2015 @ 154am).xlsx 
(hereafter Allen 05-10-15 Backup Workbook) at tabs “Forecast” and “SOTP – 
DCF.” 
93 AOL00221212. See also a comparison of the “previous” and “updated” Net 
Working Capital figures circulated by Matthew Malagari (Allen & Co.) in an e-
mail to Michael Nolan (AOL), et al., April 20, 2015 (AOL00221227-37 and 
AOL00221238). 
94 Series of e-mails between Matthew Malagari (Allen & Co.) and Michael Nolan 
(AOL), Tom Lee (AOL), Nicholas Bellomo (AOL), Mark Roszkowski (AOL), 
Vijay Kori (AOL); Omar Isani (Allen & Co.), AJ Sanna (Allen & Co.) re: Updated 
Cash Flow Items Discussion, April 18-20, 2015 (AOL00276974-81). 
95 E-mail from Tim Armstrong (AOL) to Christopher Kane (AOL), et al., April 23, 
2015 (AOL00211247). 




As I describe further below in Section VI, Allen & Co. was provided with these 
updated projections, but instead used an earlier set of projections when considering 
the value of AOL in the final version of their Fairness Opinion.  
e) Deriving Free Cash Flows 
83. An Allen & Co. analysis dated May 10, 2015 includes segment-level 
projections that incorporate the updates in working capital requirements discussed 
above and other minor adjustments contained therein.  Because these are the latest 
management-approved LTP projections that have been produced and provided to 
me, I use them as a foundation for projected cash flows in the DCF Approach.96  As 
I explain below in Section VI, however, these are not the projections that Allen & 
Co. used in their final Fairness Opinion. 
84. Having studied the differences in expected growth trajectories, margins 
and risk profiles of AOL’s segments, and given the availability of up-to-date, 
segment-level long-term projections, I believe it appropriate to use segment-level 
projections when modeling the value of the whole Company.  This is not a novel 
approach: Verizon’s advisor, Guggenheim, also considered AOL’s value using 
segment-level projections.97  
                                                     
96 However, these are not the projections ultimately used in the Allen & Co. 
Fairness Opinion.  Instead, Allen & Co. used a prior set of projections, which 
appear to have been outdated.  It is not appropriate to value AOL using outdated 
projections. 
97 Guggenheim May Valuation at 1 and 27-41. 




85. Other parties valuing AOL had previously relied upon management 
projections. For example, Deloitte relied on “the LTP (Operational Management 
LTP reflecting $537 million in 2015 AOIBDA)” for 2015-2018 which was 
“approved by AOL management and reviewed with the board in December 2014 
and January 2015.”98  Additionally, three financial advisors retained by Verizon – 
Guggenheim, LionTree, and KPMG – relied on AOL’s management projections 
dated April 24, 2015.99  
86. However, to obtain net available cash flow projections to be discounted 
to June 23, 2015, certain adjustments need to be made to the LTP projections, 
including: (i) adding expected cash flows from Millennial Media and Microsoft 
Display, (ii) extending the projections through 2025, and (iii) computing net 
available cash flow projections based on those inputs.  I explain those adjustments 
below. 
87. By the time of the Valuation Date, the Millennial Media and Microsoft 
Display transactions were in advanced stages toward completion and were therefore 
                                                     
98 Memo from Melissa Frank (AOL) and Celia Linkow (AOL) to Accounting 
Policy Files, February 7, 2015, “AOL Inc. 4Q14-011 Q42014 Goodwill 
Impairment Analysis” (AOL00345384) (hereafter Goodwill Impairment Analysis) 
at 4. 
99 Guggenheim May Valuation at 27-41, LionTree May 9, 2015 Workbook 
(LIONTREE-AOL0014658 at tab "Hanks Projections per Mngmt"), and KPMG 
Draft Report, "Verizon Communications Inc., Valuation of Certain Assets and 
Liabilities in Connection with Project Hanks,” September 1, 2015 
(AOL00346180), at Schedule 4. 




relevant to AOL’s value as a going concern.  The impact of these transactions should 
be incorporated into the projections to appropriately capture AOL’s future value 
prospects as of the Valuation Date. Further, because these two transactions had not 
been announced prior to the closing of the Merger (but were known within AOL), 
the market had not had the opportunity to account for the effects of the transactions 
and AOL’s price therefore did not reflect that information. 
88. By adding the cash flows from Millennial Media and Microsoft Display 
to the most up to date LTP projections, these cash flows better reflect AOL’s 
prospects as of the Valuation Date.  Exhibit 8 contains detailed projections for 
Platforms with and without Millennial Media and Microsoft Display to illustrate the 
impact of these transactions on the Platforms segment.  The Millennial Media 
synergized projections, contained in Goldman Sachs’ June 2015 Project Mars 
Model, extend through year-end 2019. The Microsoft Display projections, contained 
in a June 2015 AOL internal model, extend through 2024.100  As the exhibit shows, 
these transactions have an immediate, significant impact on AOL Platforms' 
revenues: revenues increase by more than 40 percent for the years 2016 through 
                                                     
100 Goldman Sachs “Project Mars Model” workbook (AOL00160436) (hereafter, 
Goldman Sachs June Mars Model) at tabs "Mars SbS" and "FCF Bridge" attached 
to an e-mail from Vijay Kori (AOL) to Nicholas Bellomo (AOL) re: Mars Business 
/ Financial Diligence, June 15, 2015 (AOL00160435). Maple internal model 
(AOL00133460 at tab “DCF”) attached to an e-mail by Nicholas Bellomo (AOL) 
to Michael Nolan (AOL) re: maple & mars, June 20, 2015 (AOL00133459). 




2018.  While the initial impact on EBITDA is slightly negative, the incremental 
estimated positive impact on AOL Platforms EBITDA is between 20 percent and 50 
percent for the years 2016 through 2018.   
89. When considering an appropriate explicit cash flow period, the key 
issue is the time it will take for the company to reach a steady state (or equilibrium 
state).  Sometimes this corresponds to the explicit forecast period used in 
management projections, but this is not always so.  AOL’s LTPs contain a four-year 
period of explicit forecasts, but two of its three operating segments were on growth 
trajectories that imply that AOL would not reach a steady state by the end of the 
four-year explicit forecast period.  (For example, management projected that the 
Platforms segment would experience double-digit revenue growth for each of those 
four years.)  As I discussed in my book, Corporate Valuation, one need not abandon 
the DCF Approach when the explicit forecasts end before the company reaches 
steady state (as is often the case with recent start-ups and high-technology firms).  
Rather, “individual cash flows are forecast up to an equilibrium point where the cash 
flow growth becomes predictable though not necessarily constant.  That 
predictability is then used to forecast the trend in cash flow without developing an 
item-by-item cash flow forecast.”101  This is called an “extended growth model.”   
                                                     
101 Corporate Valuation, at 151-152. 




90. Financial economists, valuation practitioners, investment bankers and 
equity analysts routinely apply this approach, sometimes forecasting an explicit 
projection period in excess of ten years.  In fact, when valuing AOL, Guggenheim 
applies cash flow forecasts for more than fifteen years, Deloitte applies cash flow 
forecasts for more than eleven years, and Jefferies & Co. applies a ten-year 
projection period.102   
91. In a February 7, 2015 internal memo concerning AOL’s fourth quarter 
2014 goodwill impairment analysis, AOL’s Melissa Frank and Celia Linkow 
explained that, while AOL’s LTP provides projections through only 2018, “we 
determined that a more reliable methodology for estimating fair value would be to 
extend the projections out to 10 years (through 2025) before estimating a terminal 
value.”103  Consequently, Deloitte stated in its impairment analyses that “projections 
                                                     
102 Guggenheim May Valuation at 30-31 and 35-36; Deloitte, AOL, Inc. Valuation 
For the Purpose of Accounting Standards Codification Topic 350, Goodwill and 
Other Intangible Assets as of December 1, 2014, February 24, 2015 
(AOL00346654) (hereafter Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report) at 20 and 
Exhibits 3-5; Jefferies Group, “AOL, Inc. (AOL): Strong Quarter Ahead of 
Expectations,” May 8, 2015 (AOL00121193 at -1198).  
103 Goodwill Impairment Analysis at 4 (stating that: “[a]s the LTP only goes 
through 2018, and given the evolution of the business that is projected over the 
next several years, we determined that a more reliable methodology for estimating 
fair value would be to extend the projections out to 10 years (through 2025) before 
estimating a terminal value. As a result, we worked with FP&A [Financial 
Planning and Accounting] and Deloitte to come up with reasonable growth 
estimates for revenues, margin and profitability for the seven years following the 
approved 2015-2018 LTP projections.”). 
 




for [AOL’s] revenues, expenses (including depreciation), and capital expenditures 
through 2025 for Membership, Platforms, and Brands were prepared or approved by 
Management.”104 
92. Given the positive expected Brands and Platforms revenue growth rates 
through 2018, projected future growth that Allen & Co describes as “hyper 
growth,”105 and AOL management’s practice of developing projections through 
2025 when engaged in a fair value of the Company,106 it is appropriate to likewise 
extend the LTP projections through 2025 based on projected revenue growth rates 
and EBITDA margins for Membership, Brands and Platforms before calculating a 
terminal value.  As a sensitivity check on this analysis, I consider an alternative DCF 
                                                     
104 Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at 20 (stating that: “[f]or the purpose of 
this analysis, projections for the [AOL’s] revenues, expenses (including 
depreciation), and capital expenditures though 2025 for Membership, Platforms, 
and Brands were prepared or approved by Management. [AOL] is responsible for 
these representations about its plans and expectations and for the disclosure of 
significant information that might affect the ultimate realization of any forecasted 
results… We considered the reasonableness of Management’s projections in light 
of (1) Management’s statements and other [AOL] data regarding the outlook for 
[AOL] and [the] industry and (2) our analysis and comparisons of the projections 
to (a) [AOL’s] historical financial performance and (b) the outlook for the industry, 
especially companies engaged in the same or similar lines of business.”). 
105 Deposition of Omar Isani, December 7, 2016 (hereafter Isani Deposition), at 
182:5-20. 
106 In connection with the goodwill impairment test performed in the fourth quarter 
of 2014, AOL explains in its 2014 10-K that the “cash flows employed in the DCF 
analysis are based on our most recent budgets, forecasts, and business plans as well 
as various growth rate assumptions for years beyond the current business plan 
period.” AOL Inc Year 2014 10-K at 61. 




model that uses management’s four-year explicit forecasts with an appropriate 
terminal multiple, and find valuation results for AOL that support my conclusion 
concerning the fair value of AOL. 
93. I determine unlevered free cash flows in the standard manner by             
(i) calculating net operating profits after tax (“NOPAT”) by subtracting depreciation 
and amortization, stock-based compensation and taxes from EBITDA, (ii) adding 
back depreciation and amortization, and (iii) subtracting capital expenditures and 
subtracting (adding) the increase (decrease) in working capital.  See Revised Exhibit 
9. 
94. For the years between 2019 and 2025, I used the revenue growth rates 
and EBITDA margins presented in the Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Analysis. 
Additionally, following Deloitte, I maintain constant capital expenditures at the 2018 
level through 2025 for AOL.107   
95. Because the updated 2015-2018 LTP projections allow for changes in 
working capital that are different across operating segments, I model the change in 
working capital from 2019 forward for each operating segment by holding the 
change in working capital constant at the 2018 level through 2025. I also note that 
Deloitte models zero incremental debt-free cash-free working capital for all years 
(2015 – 2025) across operating segments “[b]ased on the debt-free excess cash-free 
                                                     
107 Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at Exhibits 3, 4, and 5. 




working capital requirements of the comparable companies and historical 
financials.”108    
96. I adjust earnings to account for stock-based compensation by 
subtracting stock-based compensation from EBITDA.  This reduction in EBITDA 
fully accounts for the expenses (including potential future expenses) concerning 
stock-based compensation in the year in which it is granted. When and whether 
future payouts from conversion of stock-based compensation occur is uncertain.  
Consistent with the approach advocated in recent years by financial economists, I 
treat the entire amount of stock-based compensation as a current operating expense 
that reduces EBITDA.109  Any alternative approach does not fully offset the total 
current expense from EBITDA, and EBITDA is therefore higher.  Thus, my 
approach to stock-based compensation necessarily lowers EBITDA and cash flows.  
                                                     
108 Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at Exhibits 3, 4, and 5. 
109 See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran.  Damodaran on Valuation.  Wiley Finance (2nd 
Edition) at 369-405 (including the following excerpt at 404: “In the past two 
decades, the floodgates have opened on equity compensation, especially at 
technology firms.  At many of these firms, managers were rewarded primarily 
through options, aided by the lax accounting and tax treatment of these grants (by 
not expensing them until exercise).  In the past few years, the awareness of 
employee options has been raised by two developments…. The second was the 
belated acceptance by accounting standards boards that employee options are 
compensation and that they should be valued and expensed at the time of the grant 
(and not at exercise).”).   
 




For purposes of calculating post-tax earnings for 2019 - 2025 in my DCF model, I 
hold the stock-based compensation-to-revenues ratio constant at the 2018 level.110 
97. Lastly, for the years between 2019 and 2025, Deloitte modeled 
depreciation and amortization as “trend[ing] down over a 5 year period to be equal 
to capital expenditures by 2023.”111  I adopt this assumption through 2025 and model 
depreciation and amortization as equal to capital expenditures in the normalized 
year.112   
98. The scope of Deloitte’s services provided to AOL were limited to the 
development of “an estimate of the fair value of the equity of AOL’s Reporting 
Units… Membership, AOL Platforms, [and] Brands.”  That is, “Corporate assets 
were not allocated to any of the Reporting Units.”  Instead, “[t]o value the Corporate 
assets, [Deloitte] applied the adjusted book value method.”113  To maintain a 
consistent model that extends projections for all segments through at least 2025, I 
extend management projections from 2019 through 2025 by using a linear step-down 
                                                     
110 This approach has been adopted by this Court in the past (see Ancestry.com 
Appraisal Opinion at 52-53). 
111 Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at Exhibits 3, 4, and 5. 
112 This is a reasonable approximation of the relationship between AOL’s capital 
expenditures and depreciation given the perpetuity growth rate of 3.0 percent.  A 
more detailed estimate would have to take account of things like the rate of 
technical change, the impact of inflation on the existing capital stock, and the role 
of intangible capital, such as know-how, that does not appear on the balance sheet.   
Given the complexities involved in evaluating all those factors, I consider the basic 
assumption to be the better choice in this case.  
113 Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at 1 and 11. 




schedule.  This method allows Corporate’s annual revenue growth to steadily decline 
from 12.1 percent in 2018 (as projected by management) to 3.0 percent by the 
normalized period after 2025.  I also apply management’s projected 2018 Corporate 
EBITDA margin of 58.6 percent throughout the extended period.   
99. Other financial advisors valuing AOL at the time of the Merger 
modeled projections beyond 2018.  For instance, Guggenheim stated in its May 1, 
2015 valuation presentation that “[d]eveloping a view on [AOL’s] stand-alone value 
requires forming a view about a likely range of potential growth scenarios since the 
bulk of [AOL’s] value is attributable to the later years in the projection period and 
beyond…” and that AOL’s “Core/Membership segment is already in a stage of long-
term decline, but its Platforms and Brands segments will not have reached steady 
state revenue growth rates and margins by the end of the projection horizon in 2018.” 
In fact, Guggenheim extends projections for Brands and Platforms through 2030.114  
In a June 15, 2015 workbook, Goldman Sachs, AOL’s advisor in the Millennial 
Media acquisition, also prepared AOL stand-alone free cash flow projections beyond 
2018 and through 2022.115  
                                                     
114 Guggenheim May Valuation at 1, 31, and 35. 
115 Goldman Sachs June Mars Model at tab “Apollo SA”.  
 




100. Equity analyst Jefferies Group also issued an analyst report on May 8, 
2015 with a $67 per share price target for AOL based upon its ten-year DCF 
model.116 
101. To summarize, I use the last available LTP projections prior to the 
Valuation Date as a starting point for AOL’s expected future cash flows.  I adjust 
these projections to account for two transactions that were in AOL’s pipeline 
(regardless of the outcome of the Acquisition), extend the projections through 2025 
to account for the “hyper growth”117 expected in the Platforms and Brands segments, 
and compute unlevered cash flows. 
102. In the next sections, I explain the basis for the discount rates and 
terminal values that I apply in my DCF Approach. 
2. WACC 
103. I performed an analysis of the appropriate discount rate to apply to 
AOL’s future cash flows to determine their present value as of the Transaction Date.  
As I described above, it is standard in DCF models to use the company’s cost of 
capital, or WACC, as the discount rate.  This is the appropriate calculation for the 
discount rate because it considers the risk related to an investment in AOL’s stock, 
                                                     
116 Jefferies Group, “AOL, Inc. (AOL): Strong Quarter Ahead of Expectations,” 
May 8, 2015 (AOL00121193).  
117 Isani Deposition, at 182:5-20. 




the riskiness of the market in general, and the time value of money.  The formula for 
the WACC is: 
Cost of Capital = Cost of Equity x Equity Weight + After-Tax Cost of Debt x 
Debt Weight 
104.  The cost of equity and cost of debt are weighted based on the 
company’s capital structure: in this case, AOL’s actual capital structure as of May 
11, 2015 (the last date prior to the Merger’s announcement) consisted of 86.3% 
Market Value of Equity-to-Total Capital (equity weight) and 13.7% Total Debt-to-
Total Capital (debt weight). 
105. I relied upon a widely-used model, the capital asset-pricing model 
(“CAPM”), to determine AOL’s cost of equity as of the Valuation Date: 
Cost of Equity = Risk-Free Rate + Equity Beta x Equity Risk Premium 
a) Risk-Free Rate 
106. For the risk-free rate, I use the 20-year U.S. Treasury rate as of June 23, 
2015 of 2.92 percent.   This reflects what the discount rate would be if there was no 
market risk and the projected cash flows would be achieved with certainty.  I select 
the 20-year U.S. Treasury rate as of June 23, 2015 because the risk-free rate should 
be consistent with the period over which one is considering the cost of equity and, 
ultimately, the expected return for the company.  As I noted in my book on valuation, 
a long-term horizon is frequently used when practitioners are computing the CAPM 




because of the stability of long-term rates and the duration of long-term bonds having 
a close proximity to the duration of corporate cash flows that are being discounted.118   
The 20-Year U.S. Treasury rate is used in standard valuation guides, such as the 
Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook, that lists historical rates for the purpose of 
use in CAPM by practitioners. 
b) Beta 
107. Next I determined what equity beta to use for AOL and its reporting 
segments.  The equity beta (or “beta”) informs a practitioner about a company’s risk, 
or volatility, relative to the market’s volatility.  If a company has a beta equal to one, 
this means that the company experiences the exact same volatility as the market; 
when the market goes up, the company’s stock goes up, and when the market goes 
down, the company’s stock goes down.  A company or asset with a beta below one 
is less volatile (i.e., less risky) than the market.  If a company’s beta is greater than 
one, then the company is more volatile than the market, and tends to rise by more 
than the market when the market goes up, and tends to decline by more than the 
market when the market goes down.  A company or asset can also have a negative 
beta.  In such a case, the asset’s value rises when the market declines and the asset’s 
value falls when the market rises.    
                                                     
118 See Corporate Valuation, at 211. 




108. Beta is computed by performing a statistical technique called regression 
analysis that fits a line to a series of observed returns by minimizing the squared 
distances of those observed returns from the line.  The formula for the regression 
analysis is as follows: 
Company Return – Risk-Free Rate = ẞ x (Equity Risk Premium) + Random 
Error Term  
109. There are five key factors that affect how one computes the beta:   
 the choice of the proxy for the market portfolio, the observation 
interval (e.g., daily, weekly, or monthly); 
 
 the length of the sample period of the data used in the regressions 
(e.g., 2 years); 
 
 the estimation procedure (typically, ordinary least squares 
regression); and  
 
 the measurement error of the estimated beta.119   
  
The “random error” term is the portion of company volatility that cannot be 
explained by the model. 
110. I estimate the betas for each of AOL’s reporting segments 
(Membership, Brands and Platforms) using peer companies’ betas based on the 
following steps.  First, I identify the relevant set of segment-specific peers.  I use the 
                                                     
119 Corporate Valuation at 220. 




superset of publicly-traded segment-level peers identified by AOL in its 2014 10-K, 
Allen & Co., Guggenheim, Deloitte, KPMG and equity analysts. See Exhibit 10.  
111. Next, I estimate the historical equity beta for each peer company 
through an ordinary least squares regression using two years of weekly total stock 
returns for the comparable companies (ending on June 23, 2015), and the S&P 500 
Total Gross Returns Index (ending on June 23, 2015).  I select two years of weekly 
returns because this provides me with a sample of 104 weeks of data, which means 
that I can obtain enough meaningful results without including older data that is less 
likely to meaningfully reflect current risks.  I also select the S&P 500 Total Gross 
Returns Index because it is a common index used as a market proxy.120  Then I un-
lever each peer company’s equity beta to remove the impact of company-specific 
leverage (which might vary significantly across the peers and AOL).  Then, I 
calculate the median peer company asset beta.121  Finally, I calculate the median re-
levered beta applying AOL’s actual capital structure as of May 11, 2015 (the last 
day prior to the Merger’s announcement) applicable to each of AOL’s operating 
segments.  
                                                     
120 See, e.g., Joshua Rosenbaum and Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking, 2nd Ed. 
(Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013) at 145, note 24 (stating that “The S&P 500 is 
typically used as the proxy for the return on the market.”). 
121 I apply the median so that the peer beta to limit the potential bias resulting from 
measurement error and outliers in the data. 




112. As Revised Exhibit 11-1 shows, I find twelve peer companies for the 
Membership segment: AT&T, Comcast, EarthLink, Facebook, Google, Harte-
Hanks, IAC, Netflix, Twitter, United Online, Verizon, and Yahoo!.  The equity betas 
for these peers range between 0.55 and 1.50.  The unlevered asset betas range 
between 0.46 and 1.29, implying a median unlevered beta of 0.86.  See Revised 
Exhibit 11-1.  After relevering the median peer beta using AOL's actual debt-to-
equity ratio of 15.9 percent, I find a median relevered beta of 1.00.  This is the beta 
that I use when I estimate the discount rate for the Membership segment.  
113. For the Brands segment, I use 14 peer companies to estimate the beta.  
These 14 companies are: Bankrate, Comcast, Demand Media, Facebook, Google, 
IAC, Travelzoo, TripAdvisor, Twitter, WebMD, XO Group, Yahoo!, Yelp, and 
Zillow. The equity betas for these peers range from 0.25 to 2.13.  The unlevered 
asset betas range from 0.25 to 2.13, with a median unlevered beta of 0.98.  After 
relevering the median peer beta using AOL's actual debt-to-equity ratio of 15.9 
percent, I find a median relevered beta of 1.13.122  This is the beta that I use when I 
estimate the discount rate for the Brands segment.  See Revised Exhibit 11-2. 
                                                     
122 I calculate Unlevered Asset Beta = Equity Beta / (1+D/E) and Relevered Equity 
Beta = Median Unlevered Asset Beta * (1+D/E) relevered using AOL's D/E as of 
05/11/15 (the last day prior to the Merger's announcement). These equations imply 
that the risk of interest tax shields equals the risk of operating assets (i.e. the 
unlevered firm) and that the company’s debt is risk free. (See Robert W. 
Holthausen and Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation (Cambridge Business 
Publishers, LLC 2014), at 400. 




114. As Revised Exhibit 11-3 shows, I use 19 peer companies to estimate 
the beta for the Platforms segment.  These 19 companies are: Acxiom, Amazon, 
Blackbaud, comScore, Criteo, Facebook, Google, Harte-Hanks, Marchex, Marin 
Software, Millennial Media, Nielsen, Oracle, Rocket Fuel, Rubicon Project, Tremor 
Video, Twitter, Yahoo!, and YuMe.  The equity betas for these peers range from 
0.43 to 1.81.  The unlevered asset betas range from 0.35 to 1.80, with a median 
unlevered beta of 1.15.  After relevering the median peer beta using AOL's actual 
debt-to-equity ratio of 15.9 percent, I find a median relevered beta of 1.33.  This is 
the beta that I use when I estimate the discount rate for the Platforms segment.  
c) Equity Risk Premium 
115. The equity risk premium equals the expected return on the market net 
of the risk-free rate.  In recent years, I have applied an equity risk premium of 5.5 
percent based on an extensive review of academic literature and empirical evidence, 
including my own book on the topic (The Equity Risk Premium and the Long-Run 
Future of the Stock Market (1999)), a widely-cited academic article on equity risk 
premia by esteemed finance Professors Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (both of 
whom having dedicated their careers to empirical research concerning evidence on 
CAPM), Duff & Phelps’ Risk Premium Report, Ibbotson data on the supply-side 
approach, and research conducted by New York University Stern School of Business 
Professor Aswath Damodaran (a prominent academic expert on valuation and my 




co-author on several publications).123  I provide a summary of the basis for applying 
a 5.5 percent equity risk premium in Appendix A. 
116. I understand, however, that the Supply-Side Equity Risk Premium, 
reported as 6.19 percent in the Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook,124 has been 
frequently relied upon for purposes of appraisal proceedings by the Delaware Court 
of Chancery.125  Moreover, some valuation books, such as Rosenbaum and Pearl's 
(2013) Investment Banking, also cite to the Supply-Side Equity Risk Premium.126  
The equity risk premium “employed on Wall Street typically ranges from 
approximately 5% to 8%.”127 
117. In my calculation of WACC for AOL’s operating segments, I therefore 
use the Supply-Side Equity Risk Premium of 6.19 percent recognizing that this will 
decrease my value estimate. See Revised Exhibits 11-1 through 11-3. 
                                                     
123 Bradford Cornell, The Equity Risk Premium: The Long-Run Future of the Stock 
Market, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 1999); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. 
French, “The Equity Premium,” The Journal of Finance, vol. 57, no. 2, April 2002, 
at 637-659; Duff & Phelps 2013 Risk Premium Report; Morningstar’s Ibbotson 
SBBI Yearbook; Aswath Damodaran, “Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): 
Determinants, Estimation and Implications – The 2013 Edition,” Working Paper, 
March 2013, at 97. 
124 Morningstar’s Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook at 157.  
125 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion of Vice Chancellor Laster In Re: Appraisal of 
Dell Inc., decided May 31, 2016 at 109. 
126 Rosenbaum & Pearl (2013), Investment Banking at 145 & note 25 (stating that 
"[f]or the 1926 to 2011 period, Ibbotson calculates a market risk premium of 
6.62%."). 
127 Rosenbaum & Pearl (2013) at 146. 




d) Size Premium 
118. I also consider a modification to the CAPM based on academic studies 
that have found that there is an inverse relationship between a company’s size and 
its returns.   Because these studies indicate that observed excess returns of smaller 
stocks are generally larger than the returns for those companies as predicted by 
CAPM, some valuation practitioners and academics consider an adjustment for a 
size premium that modifies the formula for CAPM as follows: 
Cost of Equity = Risk-Free Rate + Equity Beta x Equity Risk Premium + Size 
Premium  
119. There is no agreement in the academic community and among 
practitioners, however, as to whether a size premium should be applied at all.128  This 
remains a controversial issue, and while my preferred method for computing 
discount rates does not include a size premium, I consider the adjusted CAPM 
formula above in my analysis of WACC to account for the possibility that the Court 
may find it is a reasonable adjustment.  
120. Thus, in my calculation of WACC for AOL’s operating segments, I 
consider a range of size premiums between 0 percent and 1.6 percent, the size for 
                                                     
128 See, e.g., Shumway, Tyler and Vincent A. Warther, “The Delisting Bias in 
CRSP’s Nasdaq Data and its Implications for the Size Effect,” The Journal of 
Finance, 54 (1999); Grabowski, Roger J., “The Size Effect-It Is Still Relevant,” 
The Business Valuation Review, 35 (2016).  




the decile range corresponding to AOL’s market capitalization, per Duff & Phelps’ 
2015 Valuation Handbook. As the handbook shows, AOL's market capitalization of 
$3,337 million as of the Transaction Date fits into the 5th decile, which includes 
companies with a market capitalization of $2,543 million to $3,724 million.  See 
Revised Exhibits 11-1 through 11-3. 
e) Cost of Debt 
121. The final piece is the after-tax cost of debt. AOL’s debt was not subject 
to credit ratings at or around the time of the Merger, so I must consider alternative 
estimates of the cost of debt.  S&P Capital IQ provides an estimate of AOL’s credit 
rating through its CreditModel Score service.  As of March 31, 2015, the last date 
S&P Capital IQ had an estimate available for AOL, the CreditModel score assigned 
to AOL was bb+ (meaning that the model assesses the creditworthiness of AOL as 
equivalent to a S&P BB+ rating). To estimate AOL’s pre-tax cost of debt, I 
considered an index of the yields on bonds with a BB rating.  BofA Merrill Lynch 
US High Yield BB Effective Yield reported a yield of 4.91 percent as of June 23, 
2015, per the St. Louis Federal Reserve.129  I also note that, in its December 2014 
analysis, Deloitte used a similar pre-tax cost of debt of 4.8 percent, based on 
                                                     
129 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A1HYBBEY, accessed September 8, 
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Moody’s yield on seasoned corporate bonds rated Baa which, as of June 23, 2015, 
was 5.24 percent.130  
122. This Court has favored the use of marginal tax rates in the past 
“[b]ecause of the transitory nature of tax deductions and credits.”131  The effective 
marginal tax rate for AOL is 40 percent.132  Using the 4.91 percent BofA Merrill 
Lynch US High Yield BB Effective Yield as of June 23, 2015 and applying a 40 
percent tax rate, I calculate AOL’s overall after-tax cost of debt to equal 2.9 percent. 
Allen & Co. also applies a 40 percent tax rate, which I find reasonable because it is 
consistent with Professor Damodaran’s computation of the U.S. corporate marginal 
tax rate.133 See Revised Exhibits 11-1 through 11-3. 
123. Using the inputs discussed above leads to the following WACC ranges 
for each of AOL’s operating segments: 8.25 percent to 9.63 percent for Membership, 
8.98 percent to 10.36 percent for Brands, and 10.03 percent to 11.41 percent for 
AOL Platforms.  See Revised Exhibits 11-1 through 11-3.  For the Corporate 
segment, I apply the 2015E revenue-weighted average of AOL’s operating 
                                                     
130 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DBAA, accessed September 8, 2016. 
131 Ancestry.com Appraisal Opinion at 47. 
132 See Allen & Company presentation titled “Project Thor: Presentation to Hanks 
Board of Directors,” May 11, 2015 (ALLEN_00013530-70) (hereafter Fairness 
Opinion) at 558. 
133http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/countrytaxrate.
htm, accessed September 8, 2016. 




segments’ WACC, which ranges between 9.28 percent and 10.66 percent.  See 
Revised Exhibit 9. 
124. Revised Exhibit 12 shows a detailed break-down of the WACC inputs 
used by Deloitte, Guggenheim, and KPMG, each of whom applied segment-level 
WACC calculations to AOL. As reported, these parties estimated a (i) Membership 
segment WACC from 7.75 percent to 9.75 percent, (ii) Brands segment WACC from 
8.75 percent to 17.70 percent, and (iii) Platforms segment WACC from 8.75 percent 
to 21.70 percent.  The notably high end of the ranges for Brands (17.70 percent) and 
Platforms (21.70 percent) is driven by certain ad hoc adjustments for unsystematic 
risk factors by Deloitte.  Specifically, Deloitte adds a size premium and a segment-
specific risk factor to its otherwise-standard WACC calculations.  Deloitte explains 
in its report that the “cost of equity for each Reporting Unit was estimated based on 
the application of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).”134  Deloitte, however, is 
wrong.  Under the CAPM, required rates of return are determined by a firm’s 
systematic risk as measured by its beta. CAPM does not add an additional company-
specific risk.  Academics caution against adding such “fudge” factors as company-
specific risk in applying CAPM because such factors imply that cash flows were not 
                                                     
134 See Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at 25.   
 




appropriately analyzed and projected.135  In effect, applying an ad hoc company-
specific risk adjustment to CAPM suggests that there is not sufficient information to 
provide a reasonable estimate of AOL’s value.  But if that is so, then either the 
analysis should not be performed at all, or additional information is required to create 
a reasonable estimate.  And because such ad hoc adjustments are purely speculative, 
they can be used in a results-oriented manner to derive a “desired” outcome, rather 
than a reliable one.  Removing the company-specific risk factor from Deloitte’s 
calculations yields much lower estimated WACC figures of 9.74 percent for Brands 
and 10.68 percent for Platforms.  Removing a size/liquidity premium further reduces 
Deloitte’s estimated WACC figures to 8.64 percent for Brands and 9.58 percent for 
Platforms.  These adjusted estimates of the discount rates are also more like those 
estimated by the other two financial advisors.  See Revised Exhibit 12. 
125. Finally, Revised Exhibit 12 shows that, when unsystematic risk factors 
(size/liquidity premiums and segment-specific risk) are removed, the estimated 
WACC figures that I calculate fall within the range of the financial advisors’ 
assessments of discount rates for AOL at the segment-level.  
                                                     
135 See, e.g., Brealey, Meyers, and Allen (2014) at 230, (stating that “You could 
[get] the right [present value] by adding a fudge factor to the discount rate and 
discounting the original forecast… But you have to think through the possible cash 
flows to get the fudge factor, and once you forecast the cash flows correctly, you 
don’t need the fudge factor.  Fudge factors in discount rates are dangerous because 
they displace clear thinking about future cash flows).  




3. Terminal Value 
126. Since companies have indefinite lives, forecasted cash flows must stop 
at some point and a simplified rule must be applied to estimate the continuing value 
of the company. When using a constant growth model, as with the Brands and 
Platforms segments, the terminal date must be far enough into the future so that it is 
reasonable to assume that the segment will be growing at a constant rate.   
127. AOL used a 3.0 percent long-term growth rate for Brands when 
determining the fair value of the segment on the basis that “we believe this to be an 
appropriate growth rate for a mature set of cash flows.”136  Deloitte justifies its use 
of a 3.0 percent long-term growth rate by “considering expectations for the long-
term growth rate of the industry and inflation.”137 Additionally, Deloitte presents 
estimates through 2019 for U.S. real GDP growth of 1.4 percent and U.S. consumer 
price inflation of 2.0 percent.138  As a general rule, the following equation holds: 
(1 + nominal GDP growth rate) = (1 + real GDP growth rate) x (1 + inflation 
rate) 
Using the estimates reported by Deloitte, this suggests an implied long-term nominal 
GDP growth rate equal to 3.4 percent = (1 + 1.4 percent) x (1 + 2.0 percent) – 1.  
                                                     
136 Goodwill Impairment Analysis at 4. 
137 Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at 20. 
138 Based on the Economist Intelligence Unit N.A. Incorporation’s “Country 
Forecast, United States” report December 2014, per Deloitte Goodwill Impairment 
Report at 6. 




128. Therefore, a 3.0 percent long-term growth rate falls reasonably between 
the long-term expected rate of inflation of 2.0 percent and the long-term expected 
nominal growth rate of the U.S. economy of 3.4 percent.  I adopt this long-term 
growth rate for the Brands, Platforms, and Corporate segments in my DCF model 
because this reflects a reasonable estimate of the long-term segment growth 
prospects in line with nominal GDP growth.  
129. The thrust of the academic literature is that if the growth in the final 
forecast year is well above the terminal growth rate, then a three-stage model is 
preferred. For instance, Professor Damodaran advises the use of a three-stage growth 
model if a company is growing at a high rate. He defines a high growth rate as “more 
than 8% higher than the stable growth rate.”139  Given the double-digit growth rates 
for Platforms revenue for the years into 2025, I model a three-year period after 2025 
in which the growth rate declines linearly from 7.5 percent to a long-term steady 
state growth of 3.0 percent.  I then apply this long-term growth rate of 3.0 percent in 
all subsequent periods in perpetuity.  This reflects the fact that companies tend to 
converge to a steady state growth rate over time.  Thus, rather than simply dropping 
from, 14.2 percent growth in 2025 to 3.0 percent growth in perpetuity thereafter, I 
model a transition during a three-year period from a high growth segment into a 
                                                     
139 http://pages.stern nyu.edu/~adamodar/New Home Page/lectures/basics html, 
accessed September 8, 2016.   




mature segment nearing its steady state at 3.0 percent growth thereafter.  This two-
stage approach to long-term growth was also adopted by Deloitte in their analysis of 
the fair value of Platforms.140 
130. In the case of Membership, the terminal value is simply the value of the 
entity in run-off until it no longer exists (in 2065).  AOL’s management concedes 
that Membership is expected to have declining cash flows into 2025 but “also 
believes that some level of investment in the Membership Group will continue to be 
                                                     
140 Deloitte Goodwill Impairment Report at 20 (stating that “[f]or the AOL 
Platforms reporting unit, the projections before the terminal period indicated 
growth rate [sic] in revenues of 15.0 percent. Since it is not typical for companies 
in high growth to experience a drastic decline in growth rate, the terminal value for 
AOL Platforms was estimated using an H-Model… which assumes a high initial 
growth rate… that declines linearly over time to reach a stable growth rate… in the 
steady state”).  If the high growth period (in this case, 2016-2028, or 3 years) is 
assumed to be 2H, the terminal value of the company can be calculated as: 
.  See also, Goodwill Impairment Analysis at 4 
(stating that “[f]or Platforms a constant short term terminal growth rate of 7.5% 
was assumed to be appropriate for determining the terminal value of the net cash 
flows for the periods 2026-2028, and then a terminal growth rate of 3% was used 
thereafter, as we believe this to be an appropriate growth rate for a segment in 
which cash flows are growing and expansion of the business is expected to 
continue into the future. Note that the 7.5% short term rate was used in the current 
year calculation in order to appropriately reflect the gradual future expected step 
down in terminal growth as it was not deemed to be reasonable to go from a 
growth rate of 15% in 2025 down to a terminal growth rate of 3%. As a result, the 
use of the two step approach was deemed to be reasonable… Given the increase in 
the growth projections for Platforms as compared to the prior year as a result of the 
acquisitions that took place during the year and increased outlooks in the market, 
the change is deemed to be reasonable.”). 
 




made (e.g., different product mix and offering strategies) that would likely stabilize 
and offset the projected decline.”141  Nonetheless, AOL's expectations that 
Membership revenues will continue to decline into 2025 indicates that the use of any 
long-term growth rate above zero could be overly optimistic for the segment.  I 
therefore assume run-off of the segment’s net available cash flows at a rate of 
negative 4 percent (Deloitte’s 2025 projected revenue growth rate) per year through 
the year 2065 (when the present value of Membership’s available cash flows in run-
off is equal to zero). This leads to a lower value for the Membership segment, but 
absent information by AOL that there was a specific strategy in place to renew the 
segment, I conclude that it is appropriate to assume that the segment is in runoff.  
B. Discounted Cash Flow Value of AOL Inc. 
131.  Having identified the appropriate projected cash flows, discount rates, 
and growth rates for computing terminal values, I apply the DCF Approach to 
determine the implied enterprise values for the Membership, Brands, Platforms, and 
Corporate segments.  The sum of these segments’ implied enterprise values equals 
the implied total enterprise value for standalone AOL as of the Transaction Date. 
                                                     
141 Goodwill Impairment Analysis at 4 (stating that “[f]or Membership a constant 
rate of 3% (despite the projected decline in cash flows into 2025) was assumed to 
be reasonable for determining the terminal value of the net cash flows as the 
Membership. While the cash flows are expected to decline in the outer years, 
management also believes that some level of investment in the Membership Group 
will continue to be made (e.g., different product mix and offering strategies) that 
would likely stabilize and offset the projected decline.”). 




1. DCF Using an Extended Growth Model 
132. I observed in Corporate Valuation that, when determining an 
appropriate terminal date, two principles serve as a guide: (i) one should not select 
a terminal date that “precede[s] the point at which the firm can be said to have 
reached an equilibrium state”; and (ii) that “the terminal date should be sufficiently 
far in the future that valuation errors caused by using simplified procedures to 
estimate the continuing value are mitigated by the discounting process.”142  Given 
the projected growth for AOL’s segments, I believe that an extended growth model 
most accurately accounts for the length of time it will take for AOL to reach steady 
state.   Accordingly, I model a 10-year sum-of-the-parts DCF to evaluate the fair 
value of Corporate, Brands, and Platforms, and use a run-off model for Membership.  
For the years 2015 – 2018, I rely on segment-level updated management projections 
as presented in the Allen & Co. 05-10-15 Backup Workbook.  I extend the 
projections through 2025, which are adjusted to account for the Millennial Media 
and Microsoft Display future expected cash flows.  See Revised Exhibit 9. 
133. As Revised Exhibit 9 shows, this DCF Approach leads to enterprise 
values of $4,249 million for Platforms (with a sensitivity range of $3,747 million to 
$4,858 million), $1,443 million for Brands (with a sensitivity range of $1,295 
million to $1,627 million), $1,601 million for Membership (with a sensitivity range 
                                                     
142 Cornell, Bradford.  Corporate Valuation, at 145. 




of $1,535 million to $1,673 million), and negative $1,513 million for Corporate 
(with a sensitivity range of minus $1,687 million to minus $1,372 million).  The total 
enterprise value for AOL using the DCF Approach is between $5,205 million and 
$6,472 million.   
134. I calculate AOL’s DCF-based fair value per share as the sum of the 
Membership, Brands, Platforms and Corporate segments’ enterprise value, plus cash 
& equivalents and tax attributes, minus total debt and noncontrolling interest, 
divided by AOL’s fully diluted shares outstanding as of June 23, 2015.143  This leads 
to a fair value per share for AOL as of the Transaction Date of $62.41 to $76.89.  
See Revised Exhibit 9.   
135. I also consider the impact of excluding the Millennial Media and 
Microsoft Display projections on the implied per share value of AOL.  Revised 
Exhibit 13 shows the resulting enterprise value of $3,479 million for AOL Platforms 
(with a sensitivity range of $3,092 million and $3,949 million). AOL’s total 
enterprise value is between $4,550 million and $5,563 million, which leads to an 
implied fair value per share for AOL as of the Transaction Date of $54.92 to $66.50. 
                                                     
143 Fully diluted shares outstanding per AOL00227520 at tabs “Total Fee” and 
“AOL Diluted Results_m20150622”.  Fully diluted shares outstanding change due 
to the number of in-the-money options and repurchased shares at a given price.  
See Revised Exhibit 9. 




2. Alternative DCF 
136. While I believe that it is appropriate to apply an extended growth model 
to AOL since it was not expected to achieve a steady state by the end of 
management’s four-year projection period, as a check I apply a DCF model using 
only management’s explicit forecasts.  In this case, doing so requires the calculation 
of a terminal value that reasonably captures the higher growth that is projected for 
AOL during the early part of the terminal period. This cannot be done by using the 
constant growth model, because, by definition, that involves a constant rate that 
ignores the faster growth in the earlier years.  As I noted in my book, a potential 
solution is to calculate “the continuing value of the firm […] by applying the direct 
comparison approach using currently mature firms as comparables.”144  By the direct 
comparison approach, I meant valuation using multiples derived from comparable 
companies. 
137. In its 2014 Proxy Statement and as part of its executive compensation 
process, AOL identified its Industry Peer Group as reflecting “the companies with 
which [AOL] compete[s] based on the scope of [its] operations, as measured by 
revenue.”145  Exhibit 14 shows multiples of enterprise value - to - projected EBITDA 
as of the Valuation Date for these peers.   
                                                     
144 Corporate Valuation, at 160. 
145 AOL Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, filed on April 16, 2015, at 34. 




138. I use 17 peer companies to estimate the beta for AOL as a whole.  See 
Revised Exhibit 15.  These 17 companies are: Adobe Systems Incorporated, 
Akamai Technologies, Inc., Autodesk, Inc., CA, Inc., Discovery Communications, 
Inc., Electronic Arts Inc., IAC/Interactive Corp., Intuit Inc., LinkedIn Corporation, 
Netflix, Inc., Salesforce.com, Inc., Symantec Corporation, The Interpublic Group of 
Companies, Inc., The New York Times Company, The Priceline Group Inc., Time 
Warner Cable Inc., Yahoo! Inc.  The equity betas for these peers range from 0.78 to 
1.58.  The unlevered asset betas range from 0.72 to 1.51, with a median unlevered 
beta of 1.04.  After relevering the median peer beta using AOL's actual debt-to-
equity ratio of 15.9 percent, I find a median relevered beta of 1.20.  This is the beta 
that I use when I estimate the discount rate for AOL as whole. 
139. Using the inputs discussed above leads to a WACC for AOL ranging 
from 9.36 percent to 10.74 percent. 
140. As Revised Exhibit 16-1 shows, I perform a whole company DCF 
valuation based on management’s four-year explicit forecasts and using a terminal 
multiple based upon projected 2018 EBITDA for AOL’s peers. See Exhibit 14.  I 
show the results of this analysis including Millennial Media and Microsoft Display 
in the management cash flow forecast, which results in a range of values per share 
of $74.55 to $84.55.  See Revised Exhibit 16-1.  I also consider an alternative DCF 
model that is identical except for its removal of Millennial Media and Microsoft 




Display from management’s explicit forecast, which results in a range of values per 
share of $68.64 to $77.28.  See Revised Exhibit 16-2.   
141. While I believe that a technology firm expected to experience superior 
growth after management’s explicit forecast period should be valued using an 
extended growth model, these alternative DCF models provide support for the 
findings from the extended growth model.   
C. Peer Multiples Approach 
142. A Peer Multiples Approach applies the principle that similar assets 
should sell at similar prices. Industry-specific factors, for example, are likely to 
affect all firms in an industry. Typically, one applies a ratio of the peer companies’ 
enterprise value to earnings, and then multiplies the ratio with the target company’s 
earnings to estimate the target company’s value.  
143. In the previous section, I identified a group of 18 peers AOL 
characterized as its Industry Peer Group. See Exhibit 14.  I use the 17 peers with 
complete multiples data to value AOL as a whole using the Peer Multiples Approach.  
144. Because future performance is the most meaningful in determining a 
fair value, I consider forward EBITDA multiples as of the Valuation Date for each 
of AOL’s peers, as shown in Revised Exhibit 17.  The exhibit shows a median 2015 
forward EBITDA multiple of 13.6x and a median 2016 forward EBITDA multiple 
of 11.9x.  When applied to AOL’s EBITDA forward projections (including EBITDA 




from the Millennial Media and Microsoft Display deals), the Peer Multiples 
Approach implies AOL’s per share equity values from $76.91 to $80.27. 
145. Additionally, in Revised Exhibit 17, I show a sensitivity to this 
approach that excludes the effect of adding the Millennial Media and Microsoft 
Display deals on AOL’s 2015 and 2016 EBITDA projections. The resulting implied 
equity values per share range from $80.05 to $82.05.146  This range of values is 
higher than the range including Millennial Media and Microsoft Display because 
both deals include projected losses in 2015 and AOL had offered to pay $327 million 
in 2015 related to the Millennial Media deal. 
146. Lastly, I considered performing a sum-of-part multiples approach in an 
effort to capture the differences in projected growth rates in AOL’s reportable 
segments, as I did in the DCF approach. I determined that the available information 
was not sufficient for me to rely on this analysis for two reasons.  First, consensus 
estimates for the segment peers generally did not extend after 2016, which was not 
enough of a horizon to adequately capture the medium to long-term differences in 
growth profiles amongst AOL’s segments.  Second, there was not a clear way to 
                                                     
146 If I remove the three peers with extremely high multiples (LinkedIn 
Corporation, Netflix, Inc., and Salesforce.com, Inc.), the range of implied equity 
values per share is between $72.15 (including Millennial Media and Microsoft 
Display) and $77.20 (excluding Millennial Media and Microsoft Display).  While I 
do not advocate selectively removing observations, I examine this sensitivity given 
that these companies’ multiples appear to be outliers. 




assign a multiple to the Corporate segment, which includes intersegment 
eliminations, based on the multiples assigned to the operating segments. This occurs 
because the Platforms segment suffered negative earnings in the twelve-month 
period immediately preceding the Valuation Date and had very low projected 2015 
earnings, which would suggest that one should instead apply a revenue multiple to 
Corporate based on the Platforms segment. But this suggests that applying multiples 
for the Corporate segment requires either mixing revenue and earnings multiples, or 
strictly applying a revenue multiple. Given the limitations of a revenue multiple 
approach and the flaws with mixing revenue and earnings multiples (which I criticize 
in Allen & Co.’s approach to their sum-of-parts multiples analyses), I determined 
that it would not be helpful to me in forming my opinion to consider an AOL sum-
of-the-parts multiples analysis. 
D. Precedent Transactions Approach 
 
147. As an additional indicator of AOL’s fair value as of the Valuation Date, 
I investigate Implied Enterprise Value – to – forward EBITDA multiples from 
acquisitions of U.S. internet software and services companies with total transaction 
values between $1 billion and $10 billion completed between 2006 and 2015.  
148. Exhibit 18 shows the implied Enterprise Value – to – forward EBITDA 
multiples as reported by S&P Capital IQ for the resulting 16 transactions, including 
the acquisition of AOL by Verizon. AOL’s multiple of 8.3x implied enterprise value 




– to – forward EBITDA is the second lowest in the sample, which implies that the 
consideration paid in connection with the Transaction was amongst the lowest in the 
industry with respect to the future expected earnings of the Company. 
149. I notice, however, that the variability in multiples across transactions is 
too great, ranging from 8.2x to 295.9x, in order for me to reliably base my analysis 
of AOL’s fair value per share on this approach. Therefore, while finding the analysis 
useful in contextualizing the consideration paid for the Transaction, I assign no 
weight to this approach when estimating AOL’s fair value per share as of the 
Valuation Date. 
E. Additional Valuation Considerations 
 
1. Recent Positive News about AOL 
 
150. Verizon’s financial advisor, LionTree, created a presentation called 
“Project Hanks Update” dated May 10, 2015, that notes that AOL had disclosed 
strong first quarter 2015 earnings, beating Wall Street consensus estimates and 
experiencing a 10.2 percent increase in its stock price after the release of its 
earnings.147 LionTree also acknowledged that the “standalone projections” that they 
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had used in their WholeCo DCF “exclude recent earnings momentum and 
replacement of Google search contract with more lucrative Microsoft deal.”148 
2. AOL’s Share Repurchase Plan 
151. Companies engage in share repurchase plans for a variety of reasons, 
including as a signal to the market that management believes that the firm’s intrinsic 
value per share exceeds the market price per share.149  In the years leading up to the 
Merger, AOL engaged in a share repurchase plan designed to facilitate its repurchase 
of AOL common stock.  In 2012, AOL repurchased common stock valued in 
aggregate of $698.7 million, and, in 2013, it repurchased common stock valued in 
aggregate of $134.8 million.150  In June 2014, AOL sought the authorization of an 
additional $150 million in share repurchases.  AOL viewed such an authorization as 
allowing AOL to “eliminate the dilutive impact of exercised options or vested 
restricted stock units (“RSUs”) on shares outstanding and/or of any shares issued as 
part of any future potential acquisitions” and that it would allow AOL to “accumulate 
shares at attractive valuations.”151 
                                                     
148 Project Hanks Update, May 10, 2015 (LIONTREE-AOL0069902) at -9907. 
149See, e.g., Brealey, Meyers, and Allen (2014) at 405 (stating that “[r]epurchases 
can also reflect management optimism, perhaps their view that their company’s 
shares are underpriced by investors.”) 
150 Audit & Finance Committee Meeting Agenda, January 27, 2014 
(AOL00358448), at AOL00358453, AOL00358459. 
151 Aol. Stock Repurchase Analysis, June 2014 (AOL00300731), at 
AOL00300734. 
 




152. A February 27, 2015, presentation to the Board also contemplated 
additional share repurchases.152  The presentation also reported Allen & Co.’s DCF 
analysis of $52 to $62 per share.153 
3. Indication of Interest in Acquiring Huffington Post 
153. On May 4, 2015, AOL received a preliminary indication of interest in 
purchasing a 51 percent stake in Huffington Post at a valuation of $1 billion.154  The 
offer was made by Axel Springer SE on behalf of a consortium of investors, 
including Huffington Post founder Arianna Huffington.155  A valuation of $1 billion 
is directly in line with the “High” end of Allen & Co.’s “Illustrative Brands Sketch” 
which reports a value of $1.51 billion for the total Brands segment, compared to my 
discounted cash flow valuation of $1.32 billion, which is in line with Allen & Co.’s 
“Mid” values.156  Moreover, this valuation as of 2015 suggests that AOL had been 
able to effectively monetize its 2011 purchase of Huffington Post for $295.5 million. 
  
                                                     
152 AOL Board of Directors Update, February 27, 2015 (AOL00002429), at 
AOL00002459 - 472. 
153 AOL Board of Directors Update, February 27, 2015 (AOL00002429), at 
AOL00002470. 
154 AOL00305557-58, at 58. 
155 AOL00305557-58, at 58. 
156 ALLEN_00030067, at tab “Illustrative Brands.” 




F. Findings Concerning Fair Value of AOL 
 
154. Because the DCF Approach incorporates management insider 
knowledge about the prospects of AOL, I view this method as the most reliable of 
the valuation techniques.  As I explained above, Revised Exhibit 9 shows that this 
method leads to a range of values from $62.41 to $76.89.  Therefore, in determining 
the fair value of AOL, I adopt the midpoint from the DCF Approach (including 
Millennial Media and Microsoft Display) and find a fair value of $68.98.  As 
supporting evidence, I consider that the range of per share values implied by the Peer 
Multiples Approach is $76.91 to $80.27, which reinforces my finding that the fair 
value of AOL as of the Valuation Date exceeded the Purchase Price. See Revised 
Exhibit 17. 
VI. THE VALUATION ANALYSIS PROVIDED BY ALLEN & CO. IN 
ITS FAIRNESS OPINION IS UNRELIABLE AND 
UNDERESTIMATES THE FAIR VALUE OF AOL  
A. Overview of Allen & Co.’s Fairness Opinion 
155. Allen & Co. has periodically acted as a financial advisor to AOL, 
including in 2013 and 2014 on “general corporate matters” and on corporate 
transactions.157  AOL retained Allen & Co. to act as its financial advisor in 
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connection with the Merger.158  On May 11, 2015, AOL’s Board received Allen & 
Co.’s opinion “as to the fairness, from a financial point of view… of the $50.00 per 
Share cash consideration...”159  In rendering its Fairness Opinion, Allen & Co. 
performed valuation analyses of AOL using a Peer Multiples Approach, Precedent 
Transactions Approach, and DCF Approach.160 
B. Allen & Co.’s DCF Analysis Relies on Flawed Financial Projections 
156. For the purposes of the Fairness Opinion, Allen & Co. relied upon 
financial projections that were characterized by AOL itself as “not correct,” “created 
in a vacuum,” and “stale” and which are therefore not reliable. 
157. On April 28, 2015, two weeks prior to delivering the Fairness Opinion, 
Allen sent updated net working capital projections to Verizon on AOL’s behalf, 
stating that the “…old numbers should be disregarded as they are not correct.”161  In 
discussing Verizon’s inquiry regarding the rationale for the changes, AOL’s Vijay 
Kori explained to others at AOL that: 
AOL doesn’t forecast balance sheet or working capital by 
segment…[the] old file was created by accounting [in 2014] in a 
vacuum in connection with a preliminary analysis around a 
possible spin of Core…AOL’s CFO, Controller, or [Corporate 
Development] was privy to the analysis so the original file shared 
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by AllenCo was something that was stale and not reviewed by 
corporate or the business unit…the updated numbers were 
created by our Controller, FP&A [Financial Planning & 
Analysis], and the CFOs of the segments to factor in our current 
payable and receivable cycles so is a better estimate of future 
working capital needs.162  
158. Despite the foregoing, Allen & Co. did not adopt the updated net 
working capital figures in their DCF Approach presented to the Board on May 11, 
2015, as part of the Fairness Opinion.  In an email exchange on May 6, 2015, AOL’s 
Senior Vice President of Corporate Financial Planning & Analysis Mike Nolan and 
AOL’s Chief Financial Officer Karen Dykstra discussed the significance of this 
discrepancy: “…the info provided to Thor [Verizon] to build to FCF would result in 
higher FCF than shown on this schedule. We need to confirm with Omar [Isani 
(Allen & Co.)] this morning if we and BOD are OK with the # shown on the schedule 
Omar provided so they can complete fairness opinion.”163 
159. An analysis prepared on May 10, 2015, just one day prior to the May 
11, 2015, presentation to AOL’s Board, quantifies this difference.  The workbook 
shows that the projections ultimately used in the Fairness Opinion – which Allen 
refers to as the “Old CF” (old cash flows) and “Previous LRP Cash Flow Items” 
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(previous long-range plan cash flow items) – yield materially lower unlevered free 
cash flows than the updated financial projections.164  Exhibit 19 compares these 
projections. 
160. Consistent with my DCF approach, I calculate unlevered free cash 
flows implied by projections used by different parties valuing AOL by (i) calculating 
NOPAT by subtracting depreciation and amortization, stock-based compensation 
and taxes from EBITDA, (ii) adding back depreciation and amortization, and (iii) 
subtracting capital expenditures and subtracting (adding) the increase (decrease) in 
working capital. Exhibit 19 shows that the unlevered cash flows obtained when 
using Allen & Co.’s choice of projections in the Fairness Opinion lead to 
significantly lower figures than those implied by the management projections in (i) 
Verizon’s financial advisors’ valuation analyses; and (ii) the updated projections in 
Allen & Co. May 10, 2015 workbook that I use in my DCF model.  See Exhibit 19. 
161. In relying on outdated, lower free cash flow projections, Allen & Co. 
inappropriately reduced their DCF valuation of AOL. 
C. Additional Flaws With Allen & Co.'s DCF Valuation 
162. Allen & Co.’s DCF Approach models consolidated cash flows using 
four years of AOL management projections, and terminal 2018 EBITDA multiples 
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between 6.5x and 7.5x, yielding implied enterprise values between $3.9 billion and 
$4.6 million and implied equity values between $46.88 and $55.61 per share.165 
163. Allen & Co.’s DCF Approach relied on only four years of management 
financial projections before applying a terminal value.  Yet at his deposition, Mr. 
Omar Isani indicated that when applying the DCF Approach, “[l]ike I mentioned, I 
ideally would want as long-term a forecast as possible and what we try to do is at a 
minimum have five years ideally for management when we can. And in this case, 
the businesses are still growing at such a rate that we would rather see more steady 
state financials before we apply a terminal.”166  Indeed, as discussed above, a 
significantly longer horizon is necessary in order to arrive at a “steady state.” 
164. In addition, Allen & Co. provide no basis for their selected terminal 
EBITDA multiples of between 6.5x and 7.5x.  In fact, earlier analyses produced by 
Allen & Co. – and presented to the AOL board of directors – use higher terminal 
multiples, which would lead to higher valuations.167 
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D. Allen & Co.’s Analyses Omit the Financial Impact of the Microsoft 
Display and Millennial Media Transactions 
165. AOL essentially completed the Microsoft Display deal prior to the 
Valuation Date.  In addition, as of the Valuation Date, AOL was in advanced 
negotiations to acquire Millennial Media.  These transactions were expected to 
impact AOL’s financial performance.  However, the financial projections Allen & 
Co. presented in the Fairness Opinion did not include this M&A activity and 
therefore understated AOL’s projected revenue, EBITDA, and cash flows as of the 
Valuation Date.168 
166. Both the Millennial Media acquisition and the Microsoft Display deal 
were expected to contribute significant revenue to AOL's Platforms segment.  This 
additional revenue has a dramatic impact on Allen & Co.'s Peer Multiples and 
Precedent Transactions analyses. 
167. Allen & Co. presented four analyses in its Peer Multiples Approach: (1) 
using enterprise value-to-2015E EBITDA multiples for AOL as a whole; (2) using 
enterprise value-to-2016E EBITDA multiples for AOL as a whole; (3) a sum-of-the-
parts exercise using enterprise value-to-2015E EBITDA multiples for the 
Membership and Brands segments, and enterprise value-to-2015E Revenue 
multiples for the Platforms segment; and (4) a sum-of-the-parts exercise using 
                                                     
168 Isani Deposition, at 132:13-133:7. 




enterprise value-to-2016E EBITDA multiples for the Membership and Brands 
segments, and enterprise value-to-2016E Revenue multiples for the Platforms 
segment. 
168. To perform these analyses, Allen & Co. developed several distinct sets 
of comparable companies: a set of “whole company” comparable companies, and 
one set of comparable companies for each of AOL’s three segments, Membership, 
Brands, and Platforms. 
169. Exhibit 20 illustrates the impact that the financial performance of 
Millennial Media and the Microsoft Display deal have on Allen & Co.'s sum-of-the-
parts multiples analysis, leaving all else equal. Millennial Media and the Microsoft 
Display deal contribute an additional $300 million in projected Platforms revenue in 
2015 and $950 million in 2016.  The additional cash flows from these acquisitions 
increase Allen & Co.'s Implied Equity Value per Share Range to $48.44 - $61.43 
(using Allen & Co.’s 2015E multiples) and $57.99 - $69.52 (using Allen & Co.’s 
2016E multiples). See Exhibits 20-1 and 20-2. 
170. The impact on Allen & Co.'s Precedent Transactions Approach is 
similar.  Allen & Co. selected 15 acquisitions completed between July 2009 and 
April 2015 with a total firm value (or enterprise value) of between $80 million and 
$2.4 billion.  Using an Enterprise Value-to-2015E EBITDA multiple for Brands and 
Membership, and an Enterprise Value-to-2015E revenue multiple for Platforms, 




Allen & Co. determines a sum-of-the-parts valuation with an implied equity value 
range between $47.67 and $58.82.169  Adding the incremental projected revenue 
from the Millennial Media and Microsoft Display deals, and leaving all else equal, 
increases this range to $54.11 – $67.10.  See Exhibit 21. 
E. Additional Flaws With Allen & Co.’s Peer Multiples and Precedent 
Transactions Analyses 
171. Allen & Co. selected peers based on their “professional judgment.”170 
In their May 10, 2015 Backup Workbook, Allen & Co. identify at least 14 peers of 
AOL that were “not selected” to be included in the peer multiples analysis but that, 
had they been included, would have had the effect of significantly raising median 
multiples. Allen & Co. do not lay out the basis for this exclusion in their 
workbook.171 
172. In their Sum-of-Parts Selected Public Companies Analysis, Allen & 
Co. selected two companies as peers for the Membership segment: EarthLink and 
United Online. The Enterprise Value-to-2015 EBITDA multiples for these 
companies ranged between 4.5x and 5.0x and the Enterprise Value-to-2016 EBITDA 
multiples ranged between 4.4x and 5.6x. However, Allen & Co. ultimately applied 
an Enterprise Value-to- EBITDA multiple range of 2.5x – 3.0x, a significantly lower 
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range than that implied by the selected segment comparables.172  Allen & Co. 
justified their choice stating that: 
[g]iven the declines in the Company's Membership Group 
segment anticipated by the Company, Allen & Company also 
calculated implied EBITDA multiples from the estimated net 
present value of the Company's Membership Group segment 
based on internal forecasts and other estimates of the Company's 
management and assuming that the unlevered free cash flow 
from such segment runs-off at a 10% annual rate after calendar 
year 2018, which indicated implied ranges of calendar year 2015 
and calendar year 2016 estimated EBITDA multiples of 2.5x to 
2.7x and 2.8x to 3.0x, respectively.173  
 
Allen & Co. therefore ignored the implied multiple range based on their own selected 
peers for the Membership segment and instead applied to a relative valuation 
multiple-based analysis, or multiples implied by a DCF run-off analysis.  Allen & 
Co. therefore mixed different valuation methodologies to arrive at a total enterprise 
value for AOL. 
173. In addition, Allen & Co. inappropriately blends EBITDA and revenue 
multiples in their Sum-of-Parts analyses. Allen & Co. performed a Sum-of-Parts 
Selected Public Companies Overview (a peer multiples analysis) and a Sum-of-Parts 
Selected Precedent Transactions Analysis. In both frameworks, Allen & Co. applies 
forward EBITDA multiples to the Membership, Brands and Corporate segments and 
forward revenue multiples to the Platforms segment. Allen & Co. derived a “total” 
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selected multiple range of 6.98x – 8.85x 2015E EBITDA multiple and 6.39x – 7.69x 
2016E EBITDA multiple based on a mix of EBITDA and revenue multiples. While 
the use of revenue multiples might be appropriate for Platforms, especially when the 
segment’s earnings were negative, it is inappropriate to blend different types of 
multiples to achieve a “total” multiple applicable to the entire company.  EBITDA 
and revenue multiples not only differ in nature, but greatly vary in magnitude as 
well. 
174. Allen & Co.’s Sum-of-Parts Selected Precedent Transactions Analysis 
incorrectly applies the Membership and Corporate multiples used in its Sum-of-Parts 
Selected Public Companies Analysis (peer multiples analysis).174 This results in an 
internally inconsistent analysis because precedent transactions analyses and peer 
multiples analyses, while similar in their mechanics, differ in their inputs and the 
interpretation of the resulting multiples. The multiples in a peer multiples analysis 
results from the enterprise value of a publicly traded company at a certain point in 
time, which implies that multiples resulting from this analysis are to be interpreted 
as tied to a minority stake in the subject company. Conversely, the multiples 
resulting from a precedent transactions analysis are based on the implied 
consideration paid for an entire company on a controlling basis, which may include 
premiums and/or account for synergies.  
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175. Based on the foregoing analyses, I conclude that the fair value per share 
of AOL common stock as of the Valuation Date was $68.98.  I base this conclusion 
on my independent evaluation of AOL’s value using standard valuation techniques, 
particularly the DCF Approach.  Moreover, I find that AOL’s financial advisor, 
Allen & Co., produced an unreliable valuation analysis in its fairness opinion that 
understates the fair value of AOL.  Collectively, the analyses that I perform in this 
report show that the consideration of $50 per share offered in the Merger is not a 
reliable indicator of AOL’s fair value as of the Valuation Date. 
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